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SUMMARY
•	 When	Belarus	embarked	on	the	construction	of	its	first	nuclear	power	plant	
in	Astravyets	in	2012,	the	official	objective	was	to	significantly	reduce	the	
share	which	 imported	Russian	gas	plays	 in	 the	country’s	electricity	pro-
duction.	That,	in	turn	was	intended	to	decrease	Belarus’s	economic	and	en-
ergy	dependence	on	Russia,	its	sole	supplier	of	energy	resources.	However,	
the	Belarusian	leadership’s	decision	to	build	the	plant	in	close	co-operation	
with	Russian	partners	defeated	 that	purpose.	Even	 though	 the	project	 is	
formally	a	Belarusian	investment,	Russia	has	in	fact	taken	over	full	control	
of	 its	 implementation	as	 it	 is	financing	 the	US$	 10	billion	project	 almost	
entirely.	Russia	is	the	project’s	contractor,	is	providing	the	technology	and	
will	also	provide	the	nuclear	fuel.	Given	Belarus	existing	financial,	trade,	
oil,	 gas	 and	military	 dependence	 on	 Russia,	 the	 Astravyets	 power	 plant	
project,	in	which	the	Russians	play	a	dominant	role,	will	only	perpetuate	
and	deepen	Minsk’s	dependence	on	Moscow.	All	that	the	plant	will	achieve	
will	be	to	diversify	the	fuel	mix	in	electricity	production,	but	not	the	direc-
tion	of	imports,	with	Russia	remaining	the	only	source.	
•	 Initially	Russia	intended	to	carry	out	two	nuclear	projects:	the	Baltic	Nu-
clear	 Power	 Plant	 (BNPP)	 in	 the	Kaliningrad	Oblast,	 and	 the	Astravyets	
Power	 Plant	 in	 Belarus	 (Belarusian	NPP).	 Both	were	 intended	 to	 export	
electricity,	although	the	Belarusian	plant	was	also	expected	to	deliver	some	
electricity	to	the	internal	market.	When	no	Polish	or	Lithuanian	partners	
for	the	BNPP	project	could	be	found,	and	no	export	market	to	sell	its	elec-
tricity	was	in	view,	Russia	changed	its	priorities	and	focused	on	the	Astra-
vyets	project	while	suspending	the	BNPP.	The	size	of	the	Belarusian	project	
(two	reactors	with	a	total	capacity	of	2,400	MW)	indicates	that	from	the	
start,	the	aim	was	not	to	meet	the	demand	in	the	internal	Belarusian	mar-
ket,	but	to	export	electricity	to	the	EU,	and	especially	to	the	Baltic	states	
and	Poland.	As	Poland	and	Lithuania	have	refused	to	buy	electricity	from	
the	plant,	Belarus	now	faces	the	challenge	of	utilising	the	energy	surplus	
that	will	emerge	after	the	launch	of	the	first	reactor	(in	2019)	and	especially	
after	the	second	one	becomes	operational	(in	2020).	The	output	of	the	two	
units	would	suffice	to	cover	half	of	Belarus’s	current	energy	consumption.	
Minsk	has	taken	steps	to	direct	all	the	electricity	produced	in	Astravyets	to	
the	internal	market,	e.g.	by	expanding	grids	and	making	massive	plans	to	
replace	gas-fired	heat	and	power	boilers	with	electric	units.	However,	the	
decisions	made	do	not	guarantee	that	the	operation	will	succeed,	especially	
since	it	seems	that	there	are	not	enough	funds	to	finance	it.	There	are	also	
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other	 important	 unanswered	 questions	 about	 the	 plant’s	 operation,	 e.g.	
the	question	of	reserve	capacity,	which	Lithuania	has	refused	to	provide,	
and	balancing	the	night-time	decrease	in	energy	consumption.	As	a	result,	
Belarus	may	end	up	with	a	surplus	of	power	and	be	forced	to	restrict	the	
operation	of	other	power	plants	once	the	Astravyets	plant	is	launched.
•	 There	are	many	indications	that	–	despite	the	Belarusian	leadership’s	dec-
larations	–	the	price	of	energy	produced	at	the	Astravyets	plant	will	not	be	
low.	Due	to	the	financial	terms	of	the	loan	imposed	on	it	by	Russia,	Belarus	
will	have	to	repay	around	US$	1	billion	annually	 in	the	years	2021–2036.	
The	Belarusian	state	budget	is	in	a	difficult	situation	and	there	is	a	risk	that	
if	Minsk	is	unable	to	meet	its	repayment	commitments,	Russia	could	then	
take	over	a	portion	of	shares	in	the	plant	(including	a	controlling	package).	
Moreover,	the	reorientation	of	the	Astravyets	plant	from	exports	to	domes-
tic	sales	calls	into	question	the	project’s	economic	justification.
•	 Russia	and	Belarus	may	be	assuming	that	in	future,	Central	Europe	will	face	
a	capacity	deficit	that	will	push	the	EU	member	states	to	reconsider	energy	
co-operation	with	Belarus.	However,	such	a	scenario	does	not	seem	probable	
in	the	 light	of	 the	EU’s	energy	production	and	consumption	projections.	 It	
is	much	more	likely	that	–	quite	against	Moscow’s	original	intentions	–	the	
surplus	energy	generated	by	the	Belarusian	plant	will	end	up	in	the	Russian	
market;	Russia’s	announcements	about	scrapping	some	previously	planned	
new	nuclear	unit	projects	point	in	that	direction.	However,	 in	the	current	
conditions,	with	Belarus	having	to	repay	the	loan,	the	Astravyets	plant	will	
not	be	able	to	offer	its	electricity	at	competitive	prices	in	the	Russian	market.	
•	 The	decision	 to	build	 the	nuclear	power	plant	 so	 close	 to	 the	Lithuanian	
border	has	 triggered	a	conflict	between	Vilnius	and	Minsk,	engendering	
a	deep	crisis	in	bilateral	relations.	While	the	Belarusian	side	is	still	inter-
ested	 in	 developing	 economic	 co-operation,	 and	 especially	 in	 using	 the	
Klaipeda	port	for	transit,	Lithuania’s	economic	interests	in	relations	with	
Belarus	are	currently	under	threat	and	Vilnius	is	no	longer	acting	as	an	in-
termediary	between	Minsk	and	Brussels.	Latvia	has	taken	advantage	of	the	
tensions	in	Belarusian-Lithuanian	relations	and	has	been	sending	political	
signals	that	it	would	be	interested	in	economic	co-operation	with	Belarus.	
This,	in	turn,	has	affected	Lithuanian-Latvian	relations.	
•	 Lithuania	has	concerns	about	the	safety	of	the	Astravyets	plant.	This	does	
not	 chiefly	 regard	 the	 reactor	 technology,	 which	 technically	 meets	 all	
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international	 safety	 standards.	The	 Lithuanians	 feel	 unsafe	 mainly	 be-
cause	the	Belarusian	side	does	not	have	full	control	over	the	–	effectively	
Russian	–	project,	and	factors	such	as	a	poor	working	culture	or	disregard	
for	 safety	rules	may	 lead	 to	an	accident	caused	by	major	negligence.	The	
Lithuanians	are	also	concerned	that	Minsk	will	not	keep	them	informed	
about	the	situation	at	the	plant,	forcing	the	Lithuanian	government	to	de-
velop	its	own	emergency	response	plans.	
•	 Government	institutions	in	Lithuania	have	raised	the	issue	of	the	Astravy-
ets	plant	with	the	Belarusian	government,	the	EU	and	international	organ-
isations	capable	of	influencing	the	Belarusian	project	many	times.	Howev-
er,	they	have	thus	far	failed	to	obtain	international	backing	for	their	efforts	
to	stop	the	project.	This	has	forced	Lithuania	to	change	its	strategy	and	it	is	
now	focused	on	blocking	the	trade	in	Belarusian	energy	in	the	Baltic	region	
to	undermine	the	economic	case	for	the	Rosatom	investment.	Stepped	up	
efforts	aimed	at	the	desynchronisation	of	the	Baltic	electricity	grids	with	
the	energy	system	of	Russia	and	Belarus	and	synchronising	them	with	con-
tinental	Europe	are	an	important	element	in	Lithuania’s	strategy.	Once	this	
effort	is	completed,	in	around	2025,	Lithuania	will	be	able	to	close	down	its	
existing	transmission	links	with	Belarus.	
•	 Lithuania’s	opposition	to	the	Astravyets	project	and	to	the	build-up	of	Ros-
atom’s	influence	in	the	region	has	resulted	in	a	decline	of	the	Lithuanian	
public’s	support	for	nuclear	energy.	In	2016,	the	Lithuanians	elected	a	new	
government	which	pledged	to	scrap	the	plans	to	build	a	new	nuclear	power	
plant	in	Visaginas	near	the	decommissioned	Ignalina	plant.	The	Visaginas	
power	plant	project	has	not	been	included	in	the	draft	new	National	Energy	
Strategy	which	prioritises	renewable	energy	sources.	This	means	that	the	
Lithuanian	government’s	energy	plans	do	not	currently	envisage	any	pro-
jects	based	on	nuclear	technology.	
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IntRodUctIon
Belarus’s	first	nuclear	power	plant	has	been	under	construction	 in	the	city	
of	Astravyets	for	a	decade	now.	The	project	was	able	to	start	when	Belarus	signed	
an	intergovernmental	agreement	with	Russia	in	2012,	under	which	the	Rus-
sian	side	agreed	to	finance	the	project	almost	fully	and	provide	the	technology.	
The	nuclear	power	plant	in	Astravyets	signals	the	first	time	that	ground	has	
been	broken	on	a	nuclear	power	project	in	Europe	since	the	1986	Chernobyl	
disaster.1	Although	the	Belarusian	Nuclear	Power	Plant	(Belarusian	NPP),	as	the	
project	is	officially	called,	is	being	built	just	200	km	from	the	Polish	border,	
it	rarely	appears	in	Polish	or	European	news	and	a	wider	debate	about	its	safety	
is	yet	to	take	place.	Lithuania	is	the	only	country	where	the	Astravyets	project	
has	stirred	major	controversy.	The	project	is	not	only	debated	there	–	it	has	
become	a	key	issue	in	Lithuania’s	relations	with	its	allies	in	the	European	Union	
and	NATO.	Lithuania	is	concerned	about	the	plant’s	location,	less	than	50	km	
from	Vilnius,	while	Lithuanian	experts	believe	that	the	project’s	execution	does	
not	comply	with	international	safety	standards.	As	a	result	of	the	efforts	made	
by	Vilnius,	the	Belarusian-Russian	investment	has	now	been	noticed	interna-
tionally.	
The	Belarusian	NPP	is	going	to	produce	18	TWh	of	energy	a	year	(which	corre-
sponds	to	half	of	Belarus’s	current	consumption)	and	is	a	strategically	impor-
tant	project	that	will	considerably	affect	the	energy	and	political	situation	in	the	
region.	Especially	since	it	was	initially	designed	primarily	as	a	plant	to	generate	
energy	for	exports	to	the	EU.	The	purpose	of	the	present	report	is	to	compre-
hensively	discuss	the	key	aspects	of	the	construction,	the	future	functioning	
and	the	impact	of	the	Astravyets	project.
The	paper	consists	of	six	parts.	The	initial	two	discuss	the	position	of	nuclear	
energy	in	the	energy	policy	of	Minsk	and	present	the	most	important	facts	about	
the	preparation	and	implementation	of	the	Belarusian	NPP	project,	including	
Russia’s	role	in	the	undertaking	and	its	impact	on	Belarus’s	future	energy	mix.	
The	financial	aspects	of	the	project	are	also	discussed,	including	those	related	
to	Belarus’s	obligation	to	repay	the	loans	acquired	for	the	project.	Part	Three	
focuses	on	analysing	the	position	of	the	Astravyets	project	in	Russia’s	strategy	
for	the	nuclear	power	sector.	It	emphasises	the	link	between	the	failed	Baltic	
1	 After	1986,	only	two	European	states	built	new	reactor	units	at	existing	power	plants:	Rus-
sia	at	Rostovskaya	AES	in	2014	and	at	Novovoronezh	in	2016,	with	plans	to	launch	a	new	
unit	at	the	Leningradskaya	AES	in	2019),	and	Finland	(Olkiluoto,	to	be	launched	in	2019).
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Nuclear	Power	Plant	in	the	Kaliningrad	Oblast	and	Moscow’s	financial,	techno-
logical	and	political	involvement	in	the	Belarusian	project.
Part	Four	of	the	paper	analyses	the	position	of	Lithuania,	presents	the	country’s	
arguments	against	the	Astravyets	project,	and	recounts	Vilnius’s	steps	to	stop	it,	
such	as	the	measures	to	prevent	Belarus	from	selling	its	electricity	in	the	Baltic	
region	and	the	efforts	to	speed	up	the	desynchronisation	of	the	Baltic	grids	with	
the	systems	of	Russia	and	Belarus	and	to	synchronise	them	with	the	continental	
Europe	network.	This	part	also	shows	how	the	Belarusian	project	has	affected	
Lithuania’s	energy	policy	and	Vilnius’s	relations	with	Minsk	and	Riga.	
Key	issues	concerning	the	future	of	the	Astravyets	plant	are	discussed	in	Part	
Five,	which	delves	into	the	challenges	that	Belarus	will	face	trying	to	use	the	
electricity	generated	by	the	Astravyets	plant	if	it	does	not	gain	access	to	the	EU	
energy	market.	In	that	case	Belarus	will	need	to	find	alternative	markets;	and	
since	Belarus	can	internally	consume	only	part	of	the	plant’s	output,	it	will	have	
to	sell	electricity	to	Russia.	
The	final	part	presents	the	conclusions,	although	many	important	questions	
concerning	the	project	remain	unanswered,	mainly	because	there	is	very	lit-
tle	transparency	over	the	investment	and	the	project	is	motivated	by	political	
considerations	much	more	than	by	economic	ones.	
10
O
SW
 S
TU
D
IE
S 
 0
7/
20
18
I. Nuclear eNergy IN the eNergy polIcy of Belarus
The	Belarusian	SSR	was	affected	by	the	1986	Chernobyl	nuclear	disaster	more	
than	any	other	former	Soviet	republic.	A	large	part	of	the	country’s	territory	
(mostly	 the	 Gomel	 region)	 suffered	 radioactive	 contamination,	 the	 after-
math	of	which	is	still	felt	today.	Settling	in	some	areas	is	prohibited	or	subject	
to	restrictions,	the	food	produced	there	contains	harmful	substances	and	sta-
tistics	still	show	higher	morbidity,	and	the	memory	of	the	tragedy	is	still	alive.2
Yet	despite	those	negative	experiences,	the	leadership	of	independent	Belarus	
started	to	consider	nuclear	electricity	generation	already	in	the	1990s,	seeing	
it	as	crucial	for	the	development	of	the	Belarusian	energy	system.3	This	view	
was	reinforced	in	the	following	years	by	the	more	or	less	frequent	disputes	with	
Russia,	related	to	Belarus’s	total	dependence	on	Russian	gas	supplies.	In	1993,	
the	 concept	 for	 the	development	of	nuclear	 energy,	 the	first	 in	 the	history	
of	independent	Belarus,	was	drafted,	and	the	subsequent	strategy	documents	
on	energy	invariably	listed	nuclear	energy	among	the	top	priorities.	In	the	late	
1990s,	however,	security	concerns	prevailed	and	in	1998	a	ten-year	moratorium	
on	nuclear	projects	was	passed.
It	was	only	in	2008	that	the	Belarusian	Security	Council	chaired	by	president	
Lukashenka	finally	decided	to	give	the	green	light	to	the	nuclear	power	plant	project	
and	selected	its	location.	In	the	Energy	Security	Concept	of	the	Republic	of	Belarus,	
adopted	in	December	2015,	the	launch	of	the	nuclear	power	plant	was	identified	
as	the	most	important	element	of	the	policy	to	diversify	the	energy	mix.	The	initial	
plan	also	envisaged	diversifying	the	providers	of	technology	and	nuclear	fuel	sup-
pliers,	but	with	the	selection	of	a	Russian	contractor	for	the	project	it	became	clear	
that	the	nuclear	power	plant	would	in	fact	entrench	Belarus’s	energy	dependence	
on	Russia,	which	has	been	the	country’s	sole	oil	and	gas	supplier	for	years.	
As	per	the	objectives	laid	down	in	the	document,	the	main	aim	of	the	diversifi-
cation	is	to	decrease	the	share	of	gas	in	electricity	and	heat	generation	from	the	
2	 For	more	information,	see	the	website	of	the	Department	for	the	Elimination	of	the	Effects	
of	the	Chernobyl	Disaster	at	the	Ministry	for	Emergency	Situations:	http://www.cherno-
byl.gov.by/index.php?id=105&Itemid=54&option=com_content&
3	 The	first	attempt	at	building	a	nuclear	power	plant	was	made	in	the	early	1980s.	Back	then,	
preliminary	construction	work	started	on	a	site	located	around	40	km	from	Minsk.	The	Cher-
nobyl	accident	stopped	the	project	and	the	plans	to	build	a	nuclear	power	plant	in	direct	
vicinity	 of	 the	 capital	 city	 never	 resurfaced,	 http://n1.by/news/2016/05/04/645565-kak-
segodnya-rabotayut-belorusskie-tets-i-pochem	u-posle-zapuska-aes-tarify-na
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present	90%	to	70%	in	2020	and	below	50%	by	2035.	Nuclear	energy	is	supposed	
to	make	the	biggest	contribution	to	the	diversification,	as	it	is	expected	to	account	
for	around	20%	of	total	electricity	production	by	2020	and	around	40%	by	2025.4	
It	should	be	remembered,	however,	that	those	objectives	are	largely	determined	
by	the	current	policies	of	the	Belarusian	leadership	which	seeks,	by	any	means	
available,	to	utilise	the	electricity	surplus	that	the	launch	of	the	nuclear	power	
plant	will	 generate,	 in	 the	 domestic	market.	Hence	 the	 considerable	 uptick	
in	domestic	consumption	envisaged	in	the	Belarusian	leadership’s	strategy.
table 1. Expected changes in the electricity generation and energy mix of 
Belarus in the years 2015–2035 (TWh)
2015 2020 2025 2030 2035
Annual energy production 
34.4 39.9 41.6 42.1 43.8
CHP plants (mostly gas-fired) 34.2 31.8 21.8 22 23.2
Renewables 0.27 0.95 1.8 2.1 2.6
Nuclear -------- 7.1 18 18 18
Annual energy consumption 37.3 39.9 41.6 42.1 43.8
Electricity imports 2.82 0 0 0 0
Share of the dominant fuel 
(i.e. natural gas in electricity 
and heat generation (%) 90 70 60 50 <50
Source:	Energy	Security	Concept	of	the	Republic	of	Belarus	to	2035
The	Belarusian	 leadership	assumes	 that	nuclear	electricity	generation	will	
considerably	contribute	to	improving	the	financial	efficiency	of	the	Belarusian	
energy	system.	According	to	official	estimates,	the	launch	of	the	nuclear	power	
4	 The	 Belarusian	 government	 does	 see	 a	 role	 for	 renewable	 energy	 sources,	 but	 they	 are	
regarded	as	a	secondary	component	in	the	country’s	energy	mix	that	would	merely	com-
plement	gas	and	nuclear	generation.	According	to	the	Energy	Security	Concept,	the	share	
of	renewables	in	electricity	and	heat	generation	will	not	exceed	1%	by	2035,	http://www.
government.by/upload/docs/file5a034ca617dc35eb.PDF
12
O
SW
 S
TU
D
IE
S 
 0
7/
20
18
plant	will	allow	the	country	to	cut	its	Russian	gas	imports	from	around	23	bil-
lion	m³	a	year	to	around	18	billion	m³.	That,	in	turn,	is	expected	to	enable	Belarus	
to	reduce	the	retail	price	of	electricity	by	around	30%,	i.e.	from	the	current	11.3	
cents	per	kWh	to	7.8-7.95	cents	per	kWh	by	2020	or,	in	the	worst-case	scenario,	
by	the	end	of	2021.5	However,	it	should	be	remembered	that	this	simulation	
does	not	include	the	cost	of	the	Russian	loan	granted	for	the	construction	of	the	
plant	(see	below	for	details),	the	repayment	of	which	will	start	when	the	plant	
is	launched,	i.e.	as	of	2020.	
According	to	the	Belarusian	Ministry	of	Energy,	the	change	of	Belarus’s	energy	
mix	and	the	considerable	reduction	of	the	share	of	gas	in	favour	of	nuclear	
energy	will	ensure	the	stability	of	electricity	supplies	and	shield	the	country	
from	gas	price	fluctuations	for	a	period	of	at	least	one	year	(this	is	how	long	
the	Belarusian	plant	can	operate	without	new	supplies	of	nuclear	fuel).6	Those	
calculations	were	presumably	the	basis	on	which	the	Belarusian	leadership	
assumed	that	the	Russian	loan	together	with	interest	would	be	repaid	within	
15	years	of	the	plant’s	launch	when	the	plant	breaks	even.7	
5	 The	price	cut	will	mainly	concern	businesses	in	Belarus,	which	account	for	two	thirds	of	the	
country’s	heat	consumption	and	three	quarters	of	electricity	consumption.	The	rate	paid	
by	households	 is	currently	5.49	cents	per	kWh	and	has	been	kept	artificially	 low	thanks	
to	a	cross	subsidy	mechanism	whereby	the	industrial	sector	covers	a	substantial	portion	
of	 the	cost	of	generating	energy	 for	consumption	by	households.	The	Belarusian	govern-
ment	has	been	gradually	phasing	out	the	mechanism	for	several	years,	which	has	affected	
the	level	of	housing	charges,	https:	//news.tut.by/economics/502590.html	
6	 Доля ядерной энергетики в энергобалансе Беларуси с пуском АЭС составит около 40%,	
12.12.2013,	http://atom.belta.by/ru/belaes_ru/view/belaes_ru/view/dolja-jadernoj-ener-
getiki-v-energobalans	e-belarusi-s-puskom-aes-sostavit-okolo-40-2003/t_id/1 
7	 This	is	part	of	a	business	plan	for	the	nuclear	power	plant,	drafted	by	its	management.	However,	
the	details	of	the	document	have	not	been	communicated	to	the	public,	Т.	Маненок,	Поможет 
ли БелАЭС снизить энерготарифы для предприятий на 30%?,	23.10.2017,	https://www.belry-
nok.by/2017/10/23/pomozhet-li-belaes-snizit-energotarify-dlya-predpriyatij-na-30
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II. coNstructIoN of the BelarusIaN Nuclear power 
plaNt
1. preparations and implementation of the project
Twenty-eight	locations	were	analysed	when	the	feasibility	study	for	a	nuclear	
project	in	Belarus	was	carried	out	in	the	early	1990s.	On	20	December	2008	
the	Belarusian	leadership	finally	decided	that	that	the	plant	would	be	built	the	
area	of	Astravyets,	a	district	capital	in	the	Hrodna	Region,	20	kilometres	from	
the	Lithuanian	border	and	50	kilometres	from	Vilnius.	The	decision	raised	a	lot	
of	controversy,	not	only	among	Alyaksandr	Lukashenka’s	political	opponents	
and	independent	environmental	groups,8	but	also	among	some	Belarusian	aca-
demics	who	pointed	to	the	seismic	activity	in	the	area.	They	warned	that	the	
construction	site	was	located	on	two	tectonic	fault	lines,	which	created	the	risk	
of	local	earthquakes.	Their	argument	was	based	on	an	expert	opinion	by	Belaru-
sian	scientists	who	had	advised	against	locating	a	nuclear	power	plant	in	a	seis-
mically	unfavourable	place	already	in	1993.	The	project’s	critics	concluded	that	
the	decision	to	locate	the	plant	in	Astravyets	had	been	political	and	motivated	
by	the	plans	to	export	electricity	to	the	Baltic	states	and	Poland.9	
In	May	2008,	international	corporations	from	the	nuclear	sector	were	invited	
to	submit	bids	to	build	the	plant.	Atomstroyexport	(Russia),	AREVA	(Germany/
France)	and	Toshiba-Westinghouse	(Japan/USA)	expressed	interest.	Talks	were	
also	initiated	with	China’s	CNGP.	However,	contrary	to	the	Belarusian	govern-
ment’s	initial	declarations,	no	open	tender	procedure	was	conducted	and	in	May	
2009,	the	Russian	company	was	designated	as	the	contractor.	The	decision	was	
the	result	of	(or	was	forced	on	Belarus	because	of)	the	country’s	deep	dependence	
8	 The	protest	 against	 the	nuclear	power	plant	has	 for	many	years	been	an	 important	part	
of	the	rhetoric	of	the	Belarusian	opposition	and	environmental	groups.	The	topic	returns	
with	 particular	 force	 during	 the	 annual	 commemoration	 of	 the	 Chernobyl	 disaster	 –	
remembered	in	Belarus	as	a	national	tragedy	–	on	26	April.	The	Chernobyl	March	organ-
ised	on	the	occasion	provides	an	opportunity	for	independent	organisations	to	voice	their	
opposition	to	the	project,	which	is	being	undertaken	without	public	consultation	and	bears	
environmental	risks,	http://naviny.by/new/20170131/14858
9	 The	seismic	risk	 is	 further	substantiated	by	archival	sources	which	contain	 information	
about	a	local	earthquake	in	the	area	in	early	20th	century,	which	reportedly	had	a	danger-
ously	high	magnitude	of	6-7,	http://naviny.by/article/20160906	/1473174695-ostroveckuyu-
ploshchadku-priznali-negodnoy-eshche-v-90-h73043-uchenyy-na-ploshchadke-belaes-
nichego-bolee-otvetstvennogo-chem	 The	 physics	 professor	 Grigory	 Lepin	 has	 been	 the	
most	active	promoter	of	the	science-based	criticisms	of	the	Astravyets	plant	and	has	lobbied	
for	many	years	for	the	project	to	be	discontinued.	His	arguments	are	echoed	by	the	Russian	
atomic	physicist	and	environmental	activist	Andrei	Ozharovsky.
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on	Russia	in	terms	of	economic	relations,	energy	resource	supplies,	the	defence	
alliance	and	the	participation	of	Belarus	in	Russian-initiated	integration	projects.	
In	the	years	2011–2012	the	parties	concluded	a	number	of	agreements	to	govern	
their	co-operation	on	the	Belarusian	Nuclear	Power	Plant	project.	The	March	2011	
agreement	establishing	Energoconnect,	a	joint	Russian-Belarusian	undertak-
ing,	which	was	registered	in	Minsk	on	17	June	2011,	is	of	crucial	importance.	Its	
shareholders	are	the	Belarusian	company	Belenergo	and	Russia’s	Inter	RAO	(each	
holding	a	50%	stake).	The	company’s	mission	is	to	organise	and	control	exports	
of	electricity	produced	at	the	plant	and	ensure	supplies	of	Russian	nuclear	fuel	
for	the	plant.	Moreover,	the	agreement	lays	down	the	terms	and	conditions	under	
which	the	investment	will	be	financed	from	a	US$	10	billion	credit	line	opened	
by	Russia;	this	was	particularly	important	for	the	Belarusian	side.	
Belarus’s energy and economic dependence on russia
Since regaining independence in 1991, Belarus has depended on co-oper-
ation with Russia – its sole provider of energy resources, its main market 
and main lender. Russia covers 100% of Belarus’s gas needs, and the Rus-
sian gas company Gazprom has been the sole owner of the Belarusian gas 
pipeline network and the Yamal transit gas pipeline since 2011. As much 
as 90% of electricity in Belarus is produced from gas. While power genera-
tion could use other energy resources, the Belarusian nitrate and potas-
sium plants would not be able to cut their consumption of imported gas, 
which is necessary in their production processes. Similarly, 90% of the oil 
in Belarus comes from Russia. Belarus extracts around 1.6 million tonnes 
of oil annually from its own deposits, but all that output is exported, mostly 
to Germany. Thus, the country’s two refineries (in Navapolatsk and Ma-
zyr) are completely dependent on oil imports from Russia (18 to 24 million 
tonnes of oil a year). Still in 2015, as much as a quarter of Belarus’s export 
revenues came from the sale of petroleum products. For this reason, Rus-
sian supplies of energy resources are a crucial factor not only for the func-
tioning of a large part of Belarusian industry, but also its profitability. The 
dependence on Russia is further deepened by the Belarusian economy’s 
heavy orientation towards the Russian market. According to Belarusian 
statistics, trade with Russia accounted for 40–50% of Belarusian exports 
and more than 50% of imports in the last dozen or so years. In the case of 
the agricultural and food sector, as much as 90% of its produce is sold in the 
Russian market. Belarus’s reliance on co-operation with Russia is further 
reinforced by the credit extended by Russia directly from the state budget 
and via the Moscow-controlled Eurasian Economic Union and its Eurasian 
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Fund for Stabilisation and Development. In that situation, it was an abso-
lute priority for Minsk to obtain preferential terms and conditions from 
Moscow; one of the results of this in practice was the negotiation of the 
lowest possible oil and gas prices. In this context, in the mid-1990s, after 
Alyaksandr Lukashenka came to power, Belarus decided to build a union 
state with Russia. It was the first re-integration project in the post-Soviet 
area. Since then Minsk has taken part in all Russian integration initiatives, 
including the Eurasian Economic Union launched in 2015. The two coun-
tries also co-operate closely in the areas of defence and security. Minsk’s 
loyalty to Moscow is the price for it pays for at least some of the Russian 
subsidies, which totalled around US$ 100 billion between 2005 and 2015 ac-
cording to the International Monetary Fund’s calculations (including of-
ficial aid such as loans and hidden subsidies in the form of lower prices on 
imported resources). Despite frequent tension and periodic disagreements, 
close co-operation with Russia remains the most important priority of Be-
larus’s foreign policy, guiding Minsk’s steps also in other spheres.
The	signature,	on	18	July	2012	in	Minsk,	of	an	intergovernmental	general	con-
tract	for	the	construction	of	two	nuclear	units	with	a	capacity	of	1,200	MW	each	
closed	the	opaque	process	of	negotiations	with	Moscow	and	triggered	the	start	
of	construction	works.10	The	Russian	contractor	offered	to	carry	out	the	project	
using	the	AES-2006	new	generation	power	plant	technology	based	on	inno-
vative	WWER	1200	generation	3+	reactors	developed	by	Russia’s	Atomener-
goproekt,	i.e.	the	most	advanced	technology	available	in	Russia,	which	meets	
international	safety	standards.11	The	reactors’	projected	useful	life	is	60	years.	
They	will	operate	on	low-enriched	uranium	U-235.	Russia	was	initially	expected	
to	deliver	the	fuel	for	the	power	plant	in	the	4th	quarter	of	2017	but	currently	the	
delivery	is	scheduled	to	take	place	in	November	2018.	The	fuel	will	be	delivered	
from	Russia	by	the	Rosatom-controlled	TVEL	company	under	a	contract	con-
cluded	in	December	2017.12	Water	for	the	cooling	systems	is	going	to	be	sourced	
10	 The	construction	of	auxiliary	 infrastructure	 for	 the	plant	 (such	as	access	 roads,	a	hotel,	
warehouses)	started	even	before	the	Russian-Belarusian	negotiations	were	completed.	
11	 In	parallel	to	the	Belarusian	project,	the	LAES-2	plant	near	St.	Petersburg	and	the	Novo-
voronezh	plant	in	the	Voronezh	oblast	are	being	built	according	to	the	same	designs.	For	
more	technical	details,	see:	Характеристика Белорусской АЭС,	Департамент	по	ядерной	
и	 радиационной	 безопасности	 Министерства	 по	 чрезвычайным	 ситуациям	
Республики	Беларусь,	 13.07.2012,	http://www.gosatomnadzor.gov.by/index.php/ru/bez-
opasnost-belorusskoj-aes/obshchaya-informatsiya-o-stroitelstve-belorusskoj-aes
12	 See:	Беларусь заключила контракт на поставку ядерного топлива для БелАЭС с компанией 
Росатома,	29.12.2017,	https://news.tut.by/economics/575024.html	
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from	the	river	Neris	(a	tributary	of	the	Nemunas	river)	that	flows	through	Lith-
uania,	including	Vilnius.
The	project	is	effectively	fully	financed	by	the	Russian	side.	Under	the	bilateral	
deal	made	in	November	2011,	90%	of	the	project’s	cost	is	to	be	covered	from	a	Rus-
sian	credit	line	worth	US$	10	billion.	The	Russian	state-owned	Vnesheconom-
bank	(VEB)	is	in	charge	of	disbursement	of	the	export	loan.	The	loan	was	made	
available	in	October	2014	and	its	terms	and	conditions	are	highly	restrictive.13	
It	is	an	export	loan,	and	not	a	commodity	loan,	and	uses	a	special	reimburse-
ment	mechanism	based	on	the	so-called	documentary	letter	of	credit.	After	the	
execution	of	certain	works	or	delivery	of	construction	materials,	the	project	
management	signs	the	corresponding	documents	and	sends	them	to	the	VEB.	
The	bank	checks	the	documents	and	then	the	Russian	finance	ministry	trans-
fers	the	funds	directly	to	Atomstroyexport.	This	mechanism	shows	how	closely	
Russia,	whose	confidence	in	Belarus	is	limited,	controls	the	project’s	finances.	
Under	the	contract,	Belarus	may	use	the	money	from	the	loan	until	2020,	and	
loan	repayment	is	expected	to	start	within	six	months	of	the	plant’s	commis-
sioning,	but	not	later	than	1	April	2021.	The	loan	is	to	be	repaid	in	30	instal-
ments,	payable	every	six	months,	and	the	US	dollar	is	the	currency	of	repay-
ment.14	This	means	that	for	15	years	(2021-2036)	Belarus	will	have	to	repay	
around	US$	1	billion	a	year.	There	is	a	risk	that,	should	it	be	unable	to	meet	its	
repayment	commitments,	it	will	have	to	hand	over	some	of	its	shares	in	the	
plant	(including	a	controlling	package)	to	Russia. If	Russia	were	to	take	over	the	
Astravyets	power	plant,	the	operation	would	leave	Moscow	facing	economic	
challenges.	However,	political	considerations	usually	prevail	in	Russia’s	energy	
policy	decisions.
Belarus	was	expected	to	cover	10%	of	the	cost	of	the	project,	but	in	practice	it	did	
not	have	the	money	and	obtained	an	additional	loan	from	Moscow	to	finance	its	
contribution.	On	17	May	2014	in	Minsk,	the	Belarusian	government	and	Russia’s	
VEB	bank	signed	an	agreement	for	an	eight-year	loan	worth	US$	500	million.15
13	 РФ выделит Белоруссии $10 млрд на строительство АЭС,	 3.10.2014,	 http://www.vestifi-
nance.ru/articles/47777	
14	 Белорусская АЭС: чья это будет собственность?,	 17.03.2014,	http://nmnby.eu/news/ana-
lytics/5441.html	
15	 Подписан договор об открытии кредитной линии до $500 млн на сооружение Белорусской 
АЭС,	17.05.2014,	https://www.seogan.ru/podpisan-dogovor-ob-otkritii-kreditnoiy-linii-
do-$500-mln-na-sooruzhenie-belorusskoiy-aes.html	
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According	to	a	schedule	adopted	at	the	onset	of	the	project’s	implementation,	
the	first	1,200	MW	unit	was	expected	to	be	commissioned	in	November	2018,	
and	the	second	one,	with	the	same	parameters,	in	July	2020.	However,	after	the	
300-tonne	reactor	pressure	vessel	for	the	first	unit	was	unexpectedly	damaged	
during	a	trial	assembly	in	July	2016,	the	contractor,	in	agreement	with	the	Bela-
rusian	leadership,	postponed	the	scheduled	launch	of	the	first	unit	until	Decem-
ber	2019	in	an	atmosphere	of	deep	concern,	media	speculation	and	controversy	
(stirred	mostly	by	pressure	from	Lithuania	which	publicised	information	about	
the	incident	internationally).	The	planned	commissioning	date	for	the	second	
unit	remained	unchanged.	The	Belarusian	authorities	admitted	in	early	2018	
that	the	successive	stages	of	construction	and	assembly	works	had	been	delayed	
in	the	last	three	years,	but	at	the	same	time	they	said	that	the	new,	modified	
schedule	would	be	kept.16	Indeed,	despite	the	delays,	assembly	works	on	the	first	
units	have	reached	the	peak	phase	–	as	shown	by	the	reports,	in	early	April	2017,	
that	the	reactor	has	been	installed	in	keeping	with	the	construction	design.17	
Nuclear	fuel	for	the	first	units	is	to	be	delivered	from	Russia	to	Astravyets	by	the	
end	of	2018.	The	installation	of	the	reactor’s	fuel	unit	is	expected	to	take	place	
in	the	summer	of	2019.
Because	most	of	 the	works	carried	out	 in	previous	years	were	preparatory	
in	nature	and	the	core	investment	works	were	scheduled	in	the	years	2017–
2018,	only	30%	of	the	allocated	US$	10	billion	had	been	spent	by	the	3rd	quarter	
of	2017.18	According	to	Belarusian	figures,	5,000	people	have	been	employed	
for	the	project,	including	1,400	Russian	specialists.	Most	work	is	being	carried	
out	by	Belarusian	companies;	however,	these	are	mainly	auxiliary	tasks	since	
Belarus	is	still	struggling	to	find	a	sufficient	number	of	specialists	with	practi-
cal	experience	in	building	and	operating	nuclear	power	plants.	To	address	this	
problem,	already	in	2008,	the	country	launched	a	state	programme	to	train	
16	 The	Belarusian	minister	 for	energy	Uladzimir	Patupchyk	revealed	 in	a	press	conference	
on	21	February	2018	that	since	2015,	on	average	20%	of	work	scheduled	in	any	given	year	was	
affected	by	delays.	In	his	view	the	main	reason	for	that	concerned	the	shortage	of	qualified	
specialists	and	difficulties	in	delivering	construction	materials	and	equipment,	Министр 
Потупчик недоволен темпами строительства БелАЭС,	 21.02.2018,	 http://naviny.by/
new/20180221/1519216282-ministr-potupchik-nedovolen-tempami-stroitelstva-belaes
17	 The	website	of	the	Belarusian	Nuclear	Power	Plant	has	been	online	since	2010,	which	pre-
sents	 the	official	narrative	about	 the	project	and	reports	on	the	progress	of	work,	safety	
measures	and	environmental	impact	in	a	modern	and	accessible	way	(by	Belarusian	state	
administration	standards),	http://www.dsae.by/ru/
18	 Information	 provided	 by	Mikhail	 Filimonov,	 director	 general	 of	 the	 Astravyets	 nuclear	
power	plant,	during	a	press	conference	in	October	2017,	Строительство Белорусской АЭС 
обойдется в $11 миллиардов,	https://realt.onliner.by/2017/10/12/aes-38	
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nuclear	energy	specialists,	whereby	the	leading	Belarusian	technological	uni-
versities	opened	specialist	education	programmes.	Practical	and	theoretical	
internships	at	existing	Russian	power	plants	have	also	been	offered	to	people	
working	in	the	Belarusian	energy	system	who	will	be	involved	in	the	opera-
tion	of	the	Astravyets	plant.19	Moreover,	President	Lukashenka	has	personally	
invited	Lithuanian	specialists	to	come	to	Belarus.20	However,	due	to	the	fact	that	
the	financial	conditions	are	not	very	attractive,	the	plant	has	been	struggling	
to	recruit	people	not	only	from	abroad,	but	also	domestically.
2. safety issues
The	Belarusian	government	has	repeatedly	and	publicly	made	assurances	that	
the	nuclear	power	plant	will	be	safe	and	meet	the	international	standards	for	
this	kind	of	project.	A	special	unit	of	the	interior	troops	(controlled	by	the	Inte-
rior	Ministry)	was	created	to	provide	security	to	the	plant;	 it	numbers	300	
troops	and	started	its	duty	in	the	power	plant	area	in	early	2017.	Belarus	claims	
that	special	solutions	have	been	applied	with	regard	to	people	working	on	the	
site,	to	prevent	terror	attacks	and	also	stop	independent	journalists,	civil	society	
activists	and	other	unauthorised	persons	from	entering	the	construction	site	
to	obtain	information.	Those	restrictions	were	considerably	stepped	up	in	the	
autumn	of	2016,	after	highly	controversial	incidents	on	the	construction	site,	
including	the	fall	of	the	reactor	pressure	vessel	mentioned	above.21	Independent	
Belarusian	media	and	the	media	in	Lithuania	have	published	multiple	reports	
about	errors,	inadequate	supervision	and	implementation	problems,	which	also	
imply	that	the	plant’s	security	system	may	be	imperfect.
19	 Since	 last	 year,	 Belarusian	 specialists	 have	 been	 training	 at	 the	 Novovoronezh	 nuclear	
power	plant	built	according	to	the	same	design	(AES-2006).	The	plan	is	to	train	more	than	
200	future	employees	of	the	Astravyets	plant	at	the	Novovoronezh	plant.	
20	 Lithuanian	specialists	in	the	field	of	nuclear	power	plant	operation	are	involved	in	the	pro-
tracted	dismantling	process	of	the	Ignalina	Nuclear	Power	Plant	in	Lithuania	that	stopped	
operating	in	2009;	many	of	them	will	soon	reach	retirement	age.	
21	 According	 to	 unofficial	 information	 gathered	 by	 Belarusian	 journalists,	 people	 work-
ing	on	the	construction	are	not	allowed	to	bring	mobile	phones	to	work,	face	restrictions	
on	movement	within	the	construction	site,	and	are	under	stepped-up	operational	control	
by	the	KGB.	The	journalistic	investigation	also	revealed	that	many	of	the	Belarusian	work-
ers	are	dissatisfied	with	their	low	salaries	and	arduous	work	patterns	(such	as	twelve-hour	
shifts	for	30	days),	especially	since	they	see	that	the	Russian	specialist	have	much	better	
conditions.	Many	examples	of	very	 shoddy	execution	of	 construction	works,	which	may	
cause	damage	or	even	collapse	of	parts	of	 the	plant’s	 structure,	have	also	been	revealed.	
http://naviny.by/article/20161015/1476523783-belorusskaya-aes-zona-sekretnosti-no-1;	
https://gazetaby.com/cont/art.php?sn_nid=131055	
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Meanwhile,	the	Belarusian	government	has	taken	a	number	of	information	
measures	to	improve	the	atmosphere	around	the	project.	They	have	repeatedly	
pledged	to	co-operate	with	the	International	Atomic	Energy	Agency	(IAEA)	
whose	experts	have	visited	the	construction	site	several	times	and	met	with	
Belarusian	officials	in	charge	of	the	project’s	implementation	and	supervision.22	
It	should	be	noted,	though,	that	the	IAEA’s	activities	were	taken	largely	under	
pressure	from	Vilnius.	The	visits	followed	a	schedule	proposed	by	the	Belarusian	
side.	Minsk	has	been	representing	its	contacts	with	the	agency	as	evidence	that	
the	project	is	being	implemented	in	full	compliance	with	international	stand-
ards,	and	has	dismissed	any	reservations,	including	those	expressed	by	the	
Lithuanian	government,	as	being	politically	motivated.	Responding	to	criti-
cisms	of	the	project	and	the	way	it	is	being	implemented,	Belarusian	officials	
have	said	that	they	can	demonstrate,	using	technical	data,	that	the	plant	will	
be	able	 to	withstand	all	 impacts	 including	up	to	magnitude	8	earthquakes,	
floods,	hurricanes,	explosions	and	impact	from	a	large	aircraft.23	
However,	it	is	the	plant’s	environmental	impacts	that	raise	the	most	contro-
versy.	The	laconic	communiqués	of	the	Belarusian	government	suggest	that	
design	work	on	the	nuclear	waste	storage	facility	for	the	plant	have	not	yet	been	
completed.24	The	plan	is	to	store	waste	within	the	plant	for	the	first	ten	years,	
and	only	after	that	period	will	it	become	necessary	to	store	it	in	another,	spe-
cially	designated	place.	However,	Belarusian	environmental	groups	are	already	
warning	about	the	risks	of	inadequately	storing	dangerous	nuclear	substances	
and	building	the	projected	dump	in	an	inadequate	location	(e.g.	too	close	to	pop-
ulated	areas).25	
22	 Two	IAEA	delegations	visited	the	project	in	recent	months.	One	(IRRS)	examined	the	infra-
structure,	while	 the	 other	 (SEED)	 looked	 at	 the	 project	 itself,	with	 particular	 emphasis	
on	the	external	impact,	Беларусь продолжит практику тесного взаимодействия с	МАГАТЭ 
– МИД,	7.03.2017,	https://www.interfax.by/news/belarus/1221116	
23	 Press	conference	of	Nikolai	Grusha,	director	of	the	Nuclear	Energy	Department	at	the	Bela-
rusian	Ministry	of	Energy,	Эксперт: белорусская АЭС способна будет выдержать падение 
самолета,	http://www.tc.by/exhibitions/atomexpo2013/news/1628.html	
24	 В	Беларуси	разрабатывается	проект	пункта	захоронения	радиоактивных	отходов	АЭС,	
10.07.2017,	http://atom.belta.by/ru/news_ru/view/v-belarusi-razrabatyvaetsja-proekt-
punkta-zaxoronenija-radioaktivnyx-otxodov-aes-9464/	
25	 Что	 будет	 с	 отходами	 БелАЭС,	 11.07.2017,	 http://belsat.eu/ru/programs/chto-budet-s-
othodami-belaes/	
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III. the astravyets plaNt aNd russIa’s strategy 
IN the Nuclear aNd electrIcIty sectors
Nuclear	energy	is	a	very	important	area	of	Russia’s	economic	activity	abroad.	
The	principal	form	of	that	activity	consists	in	participating	in	nuclear	power	
plant	projects	outside	Russia.	The	state-owned	Rosatom	company	implements	
Russia’s	policy	in	this	regard.	The	company	is	currently	involved	in	projects	for	
the	construction	of	a	total	of	21	nuclear	units	abroad	(including	in	Bangladesh,	
China,	Egypt,	Finland,	Iran,	Jordan,	Nigeria	and	Turkey).	Russia	is	also	active	
in	Central	and	Eastern	Europe	and	participates	in	nuclear	projects	in	EU	mem-
ber	states,	including	the	expansion	of	the	Temelin	plant	in	the	Czech	Republic	
and	new	units	at	the	Paks	plant	in	Hungary.	In	Central	Europe,	Russia	has	been	
using	its	competitive	advantage	based	on	historical	links	–	as	all	the	nuclear	
power	plants	in	the	region	are	based	on	Soviet/Russian	technology.	Moreover,	
most	of	them	source	their	nuclear	fuel	from	Russia	(see	Table	2	for	the	basic	
parameters	of	foreign	nuclear	projects	implemented	by	Rosatom).	
table 2. Nuclear projects currently pursued by Rosatom outside Russia
country project name
Number of 
units
russia’s 
financial 
involvement
source 
of 
finance
launch 
date
Bangladesh Ruppur 2 US$ 11.38 billion loan 2022–2023
Belarus Astravyets 2 US$ 10 billion  loan 2018–2020
china Tianwan 2 
2
(block nos. 
3 and 4)
- - 2018
egypt Al-Dabbah 4 US$ 25 billion loan 2026–
2029
finland Hanhikivi 1 EUR 2.4 billion
National 
Welfare 
Fund
2024
India Kudankulam 2
(units 3 and 4)
US$ 3.5 billion loan 2020s
Iran Bushehr 2 2
(units 2 and 3)
- -
2024–
2026
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country project name
Number of 
units
russia’s 
financial 
involvement
source 
of 
finance
launch 
date
turkey Akkuyu 4 US$ 4 billion state 
budget
2022 and 
following 
years
hungary Paks 2 US$ 10 billion loan 2020s
Source:	S.	Kardaś,	Rosyjsko-egipska współpraca w sferze energetyki jądrowej,	OSW	Analyses,	20.12.2017
The	main	objective	of	Russia’s	activity	in	the	nuclear	sector	is	to	use	energy	pro-
jects	to	strengthen	its	economic	influence	and	keep	or	increase	the	target	coun-
tries’	energy	dependence	on	Russia	in	order	to	gain	tools	of	political	influence.	
Moscow’s	intention	is	still,	irrespective	of	the	changing	conditions	in	Europe,	
to	keep	and	expand	its	electricity	interconnectors	with	EU	countries	to	preserve	
the	ability	to	expand	into	the	European	electricity	market.	
The	construction	of	the	Astravyets	plant	is	particularly	important	in	the	context	
of	Russia’s	strategic	objectives.	Initially,	Russia’s	key	objective	in	relation	to	the	
project	was	to	use	the	new	infrastructure	to	export	electricity	to	EU	markets	
(the	same	objective	was	behind	the	never	implemented	plans	to	build	a	nuclear	
power	plant	in	the	Kaliningrad	Oblast	(see	box).	
the Baltic Nuclear power plant in the Kaliningrad oblast 
The planned Baltic Nuclear Power Plant (BNPP) in the Kaliningrad Oblast 
(close to the city of Neman near the Lithuanian border) is an example of 
a project that was intended to enable Russia to export electricity to Euro-
pean markets. The decision to build two units with a total capacity of 2,300 
MW was taken in 2009. In view of the Kaliningrad Oblast’s very limited 
electricity needs, the real aim of the project was to export electricity to 
countries in the region (mainly Poland and Lithuania, but also Germany). 
The Russian side made the first proposals to build electricity interconnec-
tors between the Kaliningrad Oblast and Poland back in May 2010. They 
concerned the construction of a double circuit 400 kV high-voltage power 
line. In the following years Russia proposed to build modified variants of 
the interconnectors: as a direct link between the Kaliningrad Oblast and 
Poland (Mamonovo – Olsztyn), a link using existing Russian-Lithuanian in-
frastructure (Sovetsk – Bitėnai – Klaipeda), and finally a Polish-Lithuanian 
interconnection (using the LitPol Link). The Russian side also considered 
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laying a submarine electricity cable from the Kaliningrad Oblast to Ger-
many. As the potential electricity buyers showed no interest, and because 
Russia struggled to find interested external investors to fund the Baltic Nu-
clear Power Plant, the project was suspended in June 2013. 
Discussions about a nuclear power plant in the Kaliningrad Oblast recom-
menced in 2017, but their outcome so far suggests that the debate mainly 
serves propaganda purposes. On the one hand, the Russian energy minis-
ter Alexander Novak said during a visit to Kaliningrad in April 2017 that 
implementing the project is necessary in view of the projections of rising 
electricity consumption in Europe. At the same time, Rosatom representa-
tives started to intensively promote the project during open seminars and 
industry conferences, emphasising that it would generate electricity for 
export (mainly to the Central European markets), while the media start-
ed spreading reports that the reactor pressure vessel damaged during at-
tempted assembly in Astravyets would be moved to Kaliningrad and used 
on the Baltic Nuclear Power Plant. However, no steps have been taken that 
would indicate that works on the project are genuinely recommencing. 
Moreover, in view of the energy strategies of EU member states and the 
projections of electricity generation and consumption, the EU will not need 
to import electricity. On top of that, as many Western European countries 
are abandoning nuclear energy (especially Germany), the prospect of them 
importing electricity generated at nuclear power plant in the Kaliningrad 
Oblast or Astravyets does not seem realistic. 
Irrespective of the freezing of the BNPP project, Moscow has proceeded 
to expand the electricity and energy infrastructure in the Kaliningrad 
Oblast. On 2 March 2018, two large gas-fired power plants were officially 
commissioned (Mayakovskaya and Talakhovskaya, with a capacity of 156 
MW each), and two more are under construction, including the gas-fired 
Pregolskaya (with a capacity of 440 MW, planned launch in late 2018 or ear-
ly 2019) and the coal-fired Primorskaya (with a capacity of 195 MW, planned 
launch in the first half of 2020). The cost of building the four facilities is es-
timated at RUB 100 billion. The total capacity of power plants currently op-
erating in the Kaliningrad Oblast is 900 MW (2 units of the Kaliningrads-
kaya–2 CHP plant). The future demand for power capacity in the oblast will 
range, according to Russian estimations, from 250 to 840 MW, and Moscow 
argues that the expansion of capacity by around 950 MW is justified by the 
projected increase in electricity consumption in the Kaliningrad Oblast by 
even up to 100% by 2020. It has also been argued that the new projects are 
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intended to provide security in the event the existing power plants need to 
be renovated or go offline for other reasons.
Russia	already	exports	some	electricity	to	the	EU	market,	and	EU	buyers	account	
for	nearly	50%	of	the	country’s	total	electricity	exports.	Finland	is	the	biggest	
importer	of	Russian	electricity	(5.04	TWh	in	2017,	with	total	consumption	at	85.5	
TWh);	and	Lithuania	ranks	third	among	Russia’s	trading	partners	in	this	sphere	
(3.13	TWh	in	2017,	with	total	consumption	at	10.76	TWh).	A	detailed	specification	
of	the	directions	of	Russia’s	electricity	exports	is	presented	in	Table	3.	
table 3. Russian electricity exports by country (TWh)
2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
finland 3.79 4.10 2.99 3.38 5.28 5.04
lithuania 4.78 3.56 3.21 2.99 3.01 3.13
china 2.63 3.49 3.37 3.29 3.32 3.32
georgia 0.51 0.46 0.62 0.51 0.40 0.50
Kazakhstan 2.28 1.66 1.64 1.54 1.16 1.29
Belarus 3.69 3.59 1.42 2.81 3.18 2.73
Mongolia 0.39 0.41 0.39 0.28 0.30 0.37
south ossetia 0.13 0.13 0.14 0.14 0.15 0.15
ukraine 0.08 0.03 0.17 2.46 0.12 0.09
azerbaijan 0.06 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.06 0.06
total 18.36 17.53 14.043 17.49 17.00 16.68
Source:	http://www.interrao.ru/activity/
From	Moscow’s	point	of	view,	the	expansion	of	its	–	already	dominant	–	eco-
nomic	and	political	influence	in	Belarus	is	also	an	important	objective.	The	pro-
ject	would	not	be	possible	without	the	Russian	side’s	financial	and	technologi-
cal	involvement,	which	implies	that	it	will	be	operated	in	a	way	that	will	take	
Russia’s	interests	into	account.	Given	the	changing	plans	concerning	the	con-
struction	of	new	nuclear	units	in	Russia	(Rosatom	expects	delays	and	may	give	
up	some	projects),	it	is	very	likely	that	the	profile	of	the	Astravyets	plant	will	
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be	subordinated	to	Russia’s	nuclear	strategy	in	the	internal	market	in	the	com-
ing	years	(see	chapter	V	of	this	paper	for	more	details).	
The	Russian	plans	concerning	the	creation	of	a	common	energy	market	within	
the	Eurasian	Economic	Union	(EEU)	also	point	in	that	direction.	In	the	autumn	
of	2017	the	Russian	media	announced	that	the	government	of	the	Russian	Fed-
eration	would	extend	a	proposal	to	the	other	EEU	members,	i.e.	Armenia,	Bela-
rus,	Kazakhstan	and	Kyrgyzstan,	asking	them	to	hand	over	to	Moscow	their	
competences	regarding	 the	 trade	 in	electricity	within	 the	common	market	
of	the	EEU.	Those	competences	would	be	vested	in	the	Administrator	of	the	
Trading	System	of	the	Wholesale	Electricity	Market,	i.e.	the	institution	cur-
rently	in	charge	of	the	organisation	and	operation	of	the	wholesale	electricity	
market	in	Russia.	The	Russian	side	has	announced	that	the	agreement	on	a	com-
mon	electricity	market	within	the	Eurasian	Economic	Union	would	be	signed	
by	the	end	of	2019.26	If	those	plans	materialise	on	the	terms	and	conditions	pro-
posed	by	Moscow,	the	Kremlin	will	tighten	its	political	grip	of	the	EEU	mem-
ber	states’	energy	markets,	gain	more	influence	on	their	energy	strategies	and,	
consequently,	expand	its	ability	to	use	the	energy	infrastructures	of	the	EEU	
member	states.	
26	 Москва хочет быть энергостолицей,	https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/3454638	
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Iv. lIthuaNIa oN the BelarusIaN Nuclear power 
plaNt IN astravyets
1. lithuania’s arguments against the plant 
Because	Astravyets	is	in	the	direct	vicinity	of	the	Lithuanian	border	and	Vil-
nius,	Lithuania	has	been	particularly	determined	and	persistent	 in	 trying	
to	block	the	project.	Its	position	is	based	on	the	following	arguments:
•	 The selected location is not suitable for the project.	Lithuania	cites	the	
opinion	of	Belarusian	scientists	who	evaluated	the	28	proposed	locations	
back	in	199327	and	concluded	that	Astravyets	was	not	suitable	because	of	its	
geological	conditions	and	increased	seismic	risk.	Belarus	has	not	presented	
any	alternative	study	of	the	site’s	geological	and	tectonic	structure.	
•	 Belarus selected the location prior to conducting an environmental 
impact assessment,	in	violation	of	the	Espoo	Convention.	The	selection	of	
the	site	was	not	agreed	with	Lithuania,	in	breach	of	the	1994	Vienna	Con-
vention	on	Nuclear	Safety.	Since	the	2013	Fukushima	nuclear	disaster,	the	
recommendation	of	 the	 International	Atomic	Energy	Agency	 (IAEA)	has	
been	 that	no	new	plants	should	be	 located	within	 100	km	of	 large	cities.	
Meanwhile,	Belarus	 is	carrying	out	construction	works	within	50	km	of	
Vilnius,	which	means	that	in	the	event	of	an	accident,	the	Lithuanian	capi-
tal	and	one	third	of	the	country’s	population	will	be	within	the	zone	of	ra-
diological	contamination.
•	 Belarus has ignored civil society protests against the Astravyets 
plant,	in	violation	of	the	1998	Aarhus	Convention	on	public	participation	
in	decisions	concerning	the	natural	environment.	In	2015,	Lithuania	filed	
a	complaint	with	the	Aarhus	Convention	Compliance	Committee,	claiming	
that	Lithuanian	citizens’	right	to	information	had	been	violated	in	connec-
tion	with	the	Astravyets	project.	
•	 Because of the project’s location, the Lithuanian government has been 
forced to take measures to address the effects of a possible incident.	
The	cost	of	developing	countermeasures	in	the	event	of	radioactive	contam-
ination	will	be	borne	by	the	Lithuanian	side.	Lithuania	has	been	forced	to	
27	 Г.	Лепин,	Величайшая диверсия или худшая из неблагоприятных,	ОГП,	http://ucpb.org/
news/economics/velichajshaya-diversiya-ili-khudshaya-iz-neblagopriyatnykh	
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develop	evacuation	plans	for	the	capital	city,	to	create	adequate	infrastruc-
tures	 to	be	 able	 to	 carry	out	 those	plans,	 and	 to	purchase	 the	necessary	
means	to	evacuate	and	rescue	its	population.	The	plans	must	also	make	pro-
visions	for	the	possible	contamination	of	the	Neris	river;	and	Lithuania	has	
reported	the	issue	of	possible	contamination	to	the	Implementation	Com-
mittee	of	the	Helsinki	Water	Convention.	The	river	is	the	primary	source	
of	drinking	water	for	the	Lithuanian	capital	and,	since	it	is	a	tributary	of	
the	Nemunas,	it	can	potentially	contaminate	the	whole	country’s	water	re-
sources.	The	two	countries	have	not	concluded	any	agreement	on	the	use	
and	protection	of	water	in	the	Neman	tributaries,	although	Lithuania	has	
been	pressing	for	the	signature	of	a	bilateral	technical	protocol	since	2009.	
•	 Constantly monitoring the situation in Astravyets will pose a chal-
lenge to the Lithuanian services.	Minsk	habitually	reports	incidents	(for	
now,	related	only	to	construction	works)	solely	under	pressure	from	the	in-
dependent	media	in	Belarus	and	from	Lithuania.	Vilnius	is	not	concerned	
by	the	reactor	technology	but	considers	itself	to	be under major risk due 
to	 an	 inadequate working culture, a disregard for safety standards 
and poor supervision of the plant’s construction. In	the	opinion	of	the	
Lithuanian	 authorities,	 Belarus	 is	 not	 performing	 sufficient	 oversight	
of	 the	plant’s	 safety	because	 the	project	 is	 controlled	by	Rosatom.	Lithu-
ania’s	safety	assessment	is	based	on	an	analysis	of	incidents	that	occurred	
in	the	course	of	the	project’s	implementation.	It	shows	that	in	2016	alone,	
there	were	six	serious	incidents	related	to	the	construction.	Two	of	them	
involved	damage	to	two	Rosatom-produced	reactor	bodies,	which	are	part	
of	 the	 plant’s	 safety	 arrangement	 (the	 first	 reactor	 pressure	 vessel	 was	
dropped	 to	 the	ground	on	10	 July	2016,	and	 the	second	one	collided	with	
a	railway	pylon	on	26	December	2016	and,	despite	the	damage	sustained,	
was	approved	for	installation	at	the	first	unit).
•	 No stress tests have been carried out despite Lithuania’s demands.	
Lithuania	has	been	calling	for	such	tests	to	be	carried	out	with	the	partici-
pation	of	 international	experts	and	 in	keeping	with	 international	stand-
ards	for	the	assessment	of	risk	at	nuclear	facilities.	It	has	the	backing	of	the	
European	Parliament	(resolutions	of	16	November	2016	and	5	April	2017	on	
the	need	to	ensure	the	highest	safety	standards).	
•	 Belarus has been manipulating the SEED (Site and External Events 
Design) mission of the IAEA.	Since	2013,	Lithuania	has	called	on	Belarus	
to	accept	a	full	SEED	mission	to	carry	out	studies	of	the	construction	site	
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(including	stress	tests)	and	decide	whether	it	is	suitable	for	a	nuclear	power	
plant.	In	2014,	Lithuania’s	position	was	backed	by	the	Bureau	of	the	Espoo	
Convention	and	the	Nuclear	Safety	Convention.	On	16-20	January	2017,	Be-
larus	did	accept	a	partial	SEED	mission	(the	composition	of	the	mission	is	
decided	by	the	host,	not	by	IAEA).	With	regard	to	the	subject	matter	that	
Belarus	allowed	the	mission	 to	examine,	no	reservations	concerning	 the	
location	or	the	safety	measures	were	reported.	For	Lithuania,	the	way	the	
mission	was	carried	out	proves	that	Belarus’s	approach	to	safety	standards	
is	selective	and	that	Minsk	is	creating	a	falsely	positive	image	of	the	Astra-
vyets	project	to	mislead	international	public	opinion.	
•	 No adequate security measures at the plant.	While	Belarus	has	created	
a	special	military	unit	to	provide	security	to	the	plant	and	has	started	cre-
ating	an	air	defence	base	for	the	same	purpose,	direct	security	services	for	
the	plant	are	provided	by	private	security	contractors,	and	not	the	military.	
Moreover,	Belarus	has	not	 studied	 the	plant	 structure’s	 resilience	 in	 the	
event	of	 impact	by	a	 large	aircraft.	As	per	 the	2013	 recommendations	of	
the	Western	European	Nuclear Regulators Association	(WENRA),	all	newly	
built	power	plants	should	be	able	to	withstand	such	an	incident.	Belarus	
has	refused	to	conduct	such	studies.28	
2. lithuania’s objections against rosatom’s influence in the region 
Internationally,	Lithuania	has	mainly	been	raising	arguments	that	concern	vio-
lations	of	international	conventions	in	connection	with	the	Astravyets	project	
and	Minsk’s	insufficient	supervision	of	the	project.	However,	its	objections	are	
motivated	by	the	belief	that	Astravyets	is	a	Russian	economic-political	project	
and	that	Rosatom	is	implementing	the	Kremlin’s	policy	aimed	at	preserving	
Russian	political	influence	by	way	of	economic	pressure.	According	to	the	Lithu-
anian	leadership,	the	international	institutions’	failure	to	stop	the	project	and	
other	investments	in	which	Rosatom	is	involved	in	Europe	is	as	harmful	as	their	
failure	to	stop	the	Nord	Stream	gas	pipeline.29
28	 Lithuania	 invokes	 the	 example	 of	 Finland	which	 demonstrated	 that	 the	 structure	 of	 its	
Rosatom-designed	plant	on	the	Hanhikivi	peninsula	could	not	withstand	an	aircraft	impact,	
and	the	Russian	company	was	forced	to	modify	the	designs.
29	 R.	Masiulis	JAV: “Rosatom” tampa geopolitinio spaudimo įrankiu,	https://www.delfi.lt/verslas/
energetika/rmasiulis-jav-rosatom-tampa-geopolitinio-spaudimo-irankiu.d?id=72436962	
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Lithuania	occupies	a	prominent	position	in	Rosatom’s	strategy	towards	the	Bal-
tic	region.	The	region’s	only	pumped-storage	power	plant	is	located	in	Lithu-
anian	territory	in	the	town	of	Kruonis.	It	could	provide	the	necessary	reserve	
capacity	and	help	in	balancing	the	Belarusian	grid	when	the	Rosatom	nuclear	
power	plant	goes	online	(whether	in	Astravyets	or	in	the	Kaliningrad	Oblast).	
In	 relation	 to	Rosatom,	 the	Lithuanian	 leadership	 is	 anxious	not	 to	 repeat	
mistakes	made	in	the	past	in	the	relations	with	Gazprom,	to	which	Lithuania	
handed	over	control	of	its	strategic	gas	transmission	infrastructure	in	2004.30	
Gazprom	not	only	failed	to	ensure	low	gas	prices	but	also	corrupted	the	Lithu-
anian	political	elite	while	trying	to	thwart	initiatives	aimed	at	the	diversifica-
tion	of	gas	supplies	to	the	Baltic	region.	It	took	the	Lithuanian	leadership	ten	
years	to	purge	the	gas	sector	of	Gazprom’s	political	and	economic	influence,	
which	also	involved	efforts	to	convince	the	European	Commission	to	launch	the	
now	ongoing	antitrust	proceedings	against	Gazprom.	
In	2012,	Lithuania	rejected	Russia’s	offer	to	co-operate	on	the	Baltic	NPP	project	
in	the	Kaliningrad	Oblast,	despite	attempts	made	by	Rosatom	and	the	Russian	
secret	services	to	bribe	the	Lithuanian	political	elites.31	Lithuania’s	resistance	
could	have	been	an	important	factor	in	Rosatom’s	decision	to	freeze	the	Kalinin-
grad	project	and	focus	on	the	construction	of	a	nuclear	power	plant	in	Belarus.	
Minsk	is	an	important	economic	partner	for	Lithuania	because	of	the	Belaru-
sian	transit	via	Lithuania’s	Baltic	ports.	For	many	years,	the	Klaipeda	port	has	
been	striving	to	position	itself	as	the	main	Baltic	port	for	Belarusian	transit.	
Lithuania	has	also	sought	to	be	active	in	the	Eastern	Partnership	project	and	for	
many	years	maintained	relations	with	the	Belarusian	leadership,	supporting	
30	 In	2004,	the	Lithuanian	government	agreed	to	sell	Gazprom	a	34%	stake	in	the	country’s	
gas	monopoly	Lietuvos	dujos	(dealing	with	transmission,	distribution	and	trade).	Together	
with	the	stake	held	by	the	Russian	company	Itera	Lietuva,	Gazprom	thus	acquired	a	con-
trolling	stake	in	Lietuvos	dujos.	The	Russian	monopoly	failed	to	deliver	on	the	confidential	
part	of	the	privatisation	agreement	and	did	not	ensure	stable	and	cheap	gas	supplies	to	Lith-
uania.	The	rising	gas	prices	prompted	Vilnius	to	carry	out	a	radical	reform	of	the	gas	sector	
(in	line	with	the	guidelines	of	the	European	Union’s	Third	Energy	Package),	which	forced	
Gazprom	to	resell	its	gas	transmission	and	trade	assets	to	the	Lithuanian	state,	as	a	result	
of	which	Lithuania	was	able	to	launch	the	LNG	terminal	in	Klaipeda	in	late	2014.
31	 Declassified	 documents	 of	 the	 Lithuanian	 security	 service	 VSD	 (State	 Security	 Depart-
ment)	show	that	in	2012	Rosatom	tried	to	increase	its	sway	in	Lithuania	by	building	rela-
tions	with	Lithuanian	entrepreneurs,	via	whom	the	Russian	side	also	 tried	 to	bribe	pol-
iticians	of	 the	 then	ruling	Social	Democratic	Party.	Former	KGB	operatives	 in	Lithuania	
were	 involved	 in	 the	execution	of	Rosatom’s	plans.	One	of	 the	aims	of	 the	operation	was	
to	persuade	Vilnius	to	join	the	Baltic	NPP	project	or	to	allow	Rosatom	to	acquire	a	25%	stake	
in	the	Lithuanian	nuclear	power	plant	project	 in	Visaginas,	http://www.lrt.lt/naujienos/
lietuvoje/2/169550	(accessed	on	17.11.2017).
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Minsk’s	rapprochement	with	the	EU.	The	rapprochement	between	Lithuania	
and	Belarus	in	the	years	2008–2010	–	which	followed	the	lifting	of	the	EU	sanc-
tions	against	Belarus	and	occurred	during	Minsk’s	gas	disputes	with	Russia	
–	was	aimed	at	intensifying	the	two	countries’	co-operation	in	the	areas	of	tran-
sit	and	energy	–	in	keeping	with	Vilnius’s	plans	and	against	Russia’s	economic	
interests.	
The	decision	to	locate	the	Belarusian	Nuclear	Power	Plant	in	Astravyets,	i.e.	
like	 the	BNPP,	very	close	 to	 the	Lithuanian	border,	and	Rosatom’s	key	role	
in	that	project,	put	an	end	to	the	period	of	co-operation	between	Vilnius	and	
Minsk.	Moreover,	the	decision	has	triggered	the	deepest	crisis	in	Belarusian-
Lithuanian	relations,	which	continues	to	the	present,	adversely	affecting	the	
two	countries’	political	and	economic	relations	and	their	co-operation	within	
EU	programmes.	
The	weakening	of	Lithuanian-Belarusian	contacts	created	an	opportunity	for	
closer	co-operation	between	Latvia	and	Belarus.	Latvia’s	prime	minister	Māris	
Kučinskis,	who	has	been	developing	closer	contacts	with	the	Belarusian	side	
since	the	end	of	2017,	has	declared	that	his	country	is	interested	mainly	in	tran-
sit	co-operation	between	Latvia	(ports	and	railways),	Belarus	and	China	(the	
Chinese	‘Great	Stone’	industrial	park	near	Minsk).	Unlike	the	previous	efforts	
of	Lithuania,	this	co-operation	is	not	directly	aimed	at	undermining	Belarusian-
Russian	relations.32	Moreover,	Latvia’s	involvement	in	economic	co-operation	
with	Belarus	has	also	been	negatively	affecting	the	relations	between	Riga	and	
Vilnius.	Most	importantly,	it	has	undermined	Lithuania’s	hopes	that	the	Baltic	
states	would	adopt	a	joint	position	on	Astravyets	and	Rosatom’s	policy	in	the	EU	
and	promote	it	in	European	forums.	In	other	words,	it	benefits	Russia’s	policy.	
3. steps taken by vilnius with regard to the Belarusian Nuclear 
power plant
Lithuania	has	taken	two	kinds	of	measures	in	connection	with	the	Astravyets	
issue.	Firstly,	it	has	striven	to	block	the	possibility	of	Belarus	selling	the	electric-
ity	generated	at	Astravyets	in	the	combined	markets	of	the	Baltic	states,	which	
32	 On	the	occasion	of	the	Latvian	PM	Māris	Kučinskis’s	visit	to	Minsk	in	early	February	2018,	
President	Lukashenka	made	a	declaration	of	loyalty	to	Russia,	saying	that	his	country	would	
never	be	friends	with	anyone	against	Russia;	VSD medžiaga: “Rosatom” per M. Bastį bandė 
Lietuvą įtraukti į bendro verslo voratinklį,	LRT,	12.04.2017,	https://www.delfi.lt/news/daily/
world/lukasenka-baltarusija-niekada-su-niekuo-nedraugaus-pries-rusija.d?id=77122225
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are	integrated	with	the	European	market.	Secondly,	in	an	effort	that	impacts	the	
Astravyets	project,	it	has	sought	an	as	fast	as	possible	desynchronisation	of	the	
Baltic	states’	grids	with	the	grids	of	Belarus	and	Russia	(their	synchronised	
system	operates	under	the	BRELL	contract	between	the	Belarusian,	Russian,	
Estonian,	Latvian	and	Lithuanian	operators	which	still	remains	in	force).
the Baltic grids – towards synchronisation with continental europe
When the Baltic states joined the EU, their energy systems were isolated 
from the European energy system. In 2004 the development of intercon-
nectors started, and currently the Baltic region can exchange energy with 
the EU system via four asynchronous interconnections linking Estonia and 
Finland (Estlink 1, Estlink 2), Lithuania and Sweden (NordBalt), and Lithu-
ania and Poland (LitPol Link). The links to Finland and Sweden connect 
the Baltic grids with the Nordel grid (comprised of the Nordic states), while 
the link to Poland connects the Baltic grids to the UCTE grid (spanning 
continental Europe). Grid operators in the UCTE and Nordel systems work 
together under the ENTSO-E agreement which brings together European 
transmission system operators who together make up the EU energy mar-
ket. Despite the development of interconnections, the Baltic grids are still 
part of the post-Soviet IPS/UPS synchronous system (under the BRELL 
agreement on co-operation between the operators in Belarus, Russia, Es-
tonia, Latvia and Lithuania). Currently the three Baltic states intend to de-
synchronise from the IPS/UPS and synchronise with the continental Eu-
rope grid using the Polish-Lithuania interconnection LitPol Link. 
The	synchronisation	of	the	Baltic	grids,	supported	by	the	European	Commission	
which	provides	financing	from	the	CEF,	is	scheduled	to	be	completed	in	2025.	
The	commission	agreed	with	the	case	made	by	the	Baltic	states	that	while	desyn-
chronisation	and	synchronisation	are	costly	processes,	in	the	current	IPS/UPS	
system	the	Baltic	states	do	not	have	full	control	over	the	grid	system	param-
eters	because	supervision	is	exercised	by	the	system	headquarters	in	Moscow.	
The	grid	created	under	the	BRELL	agreement	spans	a	large	territory,	and	the	
Russian	and	Belarusian	infrastructures	are	obsolete	and	often	malfunction.	
The	Baltic	states	do	not	have	access	either	to	information	on	the	system’s	current	
condition,	nor	to	plans	regarding	its	modernisation	and	development.	Another	
argument	for	synchronisation	refers	to	the	ambitions	to	build	an	integrated	
European	electricity	market	in	which	EU	actors	trading	in	electricity	would	
compete	 for	 customers	 on	 a	 level	 playing	field.	Harmonising	 the	 technical	
parameters	through	synchronisation	is	one	of	the	ways	to	ensure	such	a	level	
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playing	field.	Finally,	 the	Baltic	states	have	also	argued	that	Russia	has	not	
signed	the	Energy	Charter,	which	may	render	it	more	difficult	for	states	syn-
chronised	with	its	energy	system	to	function	in	the	European	energy	market.	
where is lithuania’s electricity produced? 
Since the Ignalina NPP was phased out on 31 December 2009, the Elektrėnai 
power plant (with a reserve capacity unit and a new combined cycle unit 
operating on gas/mazut), the pumped-storage plant in Kruonis and the Al-
girdas Brazauskas hydro power plant in Kaunas have been the country’s 
main power generators. All three are owned by the state-owned company 
Lietuvos Energijos Gamyba which generates and trades in electricity, sell-
ing it in the Nord Pool Spot exchange and providing balancing services to 
energy suppliers. There are also other, smaller power plants that use local 
and renewable sources (mainly CHP plants running on biomass and wind 
farms). The Lithuanian power plants are able to fully cover the country’s 
electricity demand, but they use only around 22% of their installed capac-
ity because the price of electricity generated in Lithuania is not competitive 
due to the need to import fuels (gas and mazut). Because of that, Lithuania 
imports energy, mainly from Estonia, Latvia, the Nordic states, Poland, 
Russia and Belarus. Before 2016, around 50% of imported electricity on av-
erage came from Estonia and the Nordic states, and another 50% from Rus-
sia (with around 2% coming from Belarus). When the NordBalt and LitPol 
Link interconnections were launched in early 2016, the structure of energy 
imports changed. The interconnections allowed Lithuania to better diver-
sify its imports and reduced its dependence on providers outside the EU, es-
pecially Russia. In 2016, imports from Latvia, Estonia, Sweden and Poland 
accounted for 70% of Lithuania’s total electricity imports. The remaining 
30% came from Russia and Belarus. 
3.1. Efforts to block trade in Belarusian electricity
The	Lithuanian	government	is	determined	to	prevent	Belarus	and	Russia	from	
becoming	the	main	exporters	of	electricity	to	the	Lithuanian	market	and	cashing	
in	the	related	profits,	estimated	at	EUR	700	million	a	year.	Should	that	happen,	
Lithuania’s	economy	would	become	more	closely	tied	to	the	Belarusian	Nuclear	
Power	Plant	in	Astravyets.	That	is	why	Vilnius	decided	to	take	measures	which	
are	controversial	from	a	market	economy	point	of	view,	to	block	the	possibility	
of	Belarus	selling	the	Astravyets-generated	electricity	in	the	Baltic	region.	On	20	
April	2017,	the	Lithuanian	parliament	adopted	a	bill	‘On	the	necessary	safeguards	
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against	threats	from	unsafe	third-country	nuclear	power	plants’.33	The	bill	states	
that	electricity	from	nuclear	power	plants	deemed	by	the	Lithuanian	parliament	
to	be	unsafe	(and	so	far,	only	the	Astravyets	NPP	has	been	declared	unsafe)34	
cannot	be	traded	in	the	Lithuanian	market.	The	prohibition	will	enter	into	force	
the	moment	the	Belarusian	power	plant	is	launched	and	will	apply	to	commer-
cial	flows,	without	affecting	technical	flows,	i.e.	the	energy	needed	to	preserve	
the	stability	of	the	energy	grids	of	Lithuania	and	Belarus.	On	13	September	2017,	
the	Lithuanian	government	approved	an	action	plan	to	block	trade	in	electricity	
coming	from	Astravyets.	It	also	prohibited	the	Kruonis	facility	from	providing	
balancing	services	to	Belarus.	By	the	2nd	quarter	of	2018,	agreements	are	also	
to	be	signed	with	Latvia	and	Estonia	on	the	imposition	of	tariffs	on	energy	trans-
mission	from	third	countries,	subject	to	the	European	Commission’s	approval.	
Currently	Belarusian	and	Russian	companies	selling	electricity	to	Lithuania	pay	
no	such	tariffs,	even	though	Lithuanian	exporters	do.
The	objective	behind	the	adoption	of	the	Lithuanian	action	plan	is	not	only	
to	block	the	export	of	energy	generated	at	Astravyets,	but	also	to	step	up	the	
efforts	aimed	at	getting	the	other	countries	in	the	region	to	align	with	Lithu-
ania’s	position	on	the	Astravyets	plant.	Moreover,	Lithuania’s	strategy	also	
seeks	to	stimulate	closer	European	and	regional	energy	co-operation.	So	far,	
Lithuania’s	 position	 on	 the	Belarusian	Nuclear	 Power	 Plant	 has	 been	 sup-
ported	mainly	by	Poland.35	Poland’s	declarations	were	particularly	important	
for	Lithuania	in	the	context	of	its	relations	with	Latvia	and	Estonia.	While	the	
governments	of	the	two	countries	do	share	Lithuania’s	view	that	the	Astravyets	
plant	should	meet	all	European	and	international	safety	standards,	they	have	
made	no	clear	statements	as	to	whether	they	would	take	any	measures	to	block	
Belarusian	energy	exports.	At	this	stage,	when	the	Belarusian	authorities	are	
already	announcing	the	first	reactor’s	launch	date,	the	Lithuanian	government	
33	 The	text	of	the	bill	can	be	consulted	at:	https://www.e-tar.lt/portal/lt/legalAct/baeac2202f-
3c11e78397ae072f58c508	
34	 The	bill	provides	that	‘unsafe	plants’	are	those	whose	design,	construction	or	operation	fails	
to	meet	safety	standards	related	to	environmental	protection	and	protection	against	radi-
ation	or	which	breach	 international	 agreements	 and	 conventions,	 and	 those	which	pose	
a	threat	to	the	safety,	the	natural	environment	and	human	health	in	the	Republic	of	Lithu-
ania	because	of	their	geographic	location	or	technology	used.	The	Lithuanian	parliament	
will	declare	third-country	nuclear	power	plants	as	unsafe	on	a	case	by	case	basis	through	
separate	legal	bills.
35	 On	 17	March	2017,	Piotr	Naimski,	 the	Polish	minister	and	governmental	plenipotentiary	
for	strategic	energy	infrastructure,	announced	that	Poland	would	not	buy	electricity	from	
Astravyets	 and	 would	 dismantle	 the	 no-longer	 functioning	 Ros–Białystok	 link,	 http://
www.energetyka24.com/563903,minister-naimski-nie-dla-energii-z-bialorusi	
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views	blocking	energy	exports	as	more	effective	than	attempts	at	demonstrat-
ing	that	the	project	violates	international	safety	standards.	The	Lithuania	tactic	
may	succeed	in	delaying	the	launch	of	the	second	reactor	in	Astravyets	or	even	
preventing	its	commissioning	altogether.
According	to	Litgrid,	the	Lithuanian	transmission	system	operator,	Lithuania	
is	able	to	singlehandedly	block	commercial	energy	flows	from	Belarus.	To	this	
end,	Vilnius	intends	to	use	the	Nord	Pool	power	market,36	and	thus	avoid	hav-
ing	to	invest	in	new	facilities	such	as	phase	shifters	and	having	to	bear	the	
additional	costs	of	the	measures	to	block	Astravyets’s	energy	exports.	Trade	
in	energy	with	Belarus	or	the	other	countries	with	which	Lithuania	has	inter-
connections	is	possible	only	via	the	power	market.	This	means	that	the	Lithu-
anian	institutions	will	be	able	to	control	commercial	contracts	made	there	and	
block	contracts	to	be	executed	via	any	of	the	five	existing	interconnections	
between	Lithuania	and	Belarus.37	While	the	physical	transmission	of	energy	
will	not	be	blocked,	trade	will	no	longer	be	possible.	This	not	only	means	that	
the	Astravyets	power	plant	will	not	be	able	to	offer	its	electricity	in	the	Lithu-
anian	market,	but	also	that	other	Belarusian	entities	which	currently	trade	via	
Nord	Pool	will	be	unable	to	sell	it.	Such	will	be	the	consequences	of	the	decision	
to	block	commercial	flows,	because	it	is	not	possible	to	determine	if	the	energy	
offered	comes	from	a	nuclear	power	plant	or	another	source.	Those	measures	
may	be	 seen	as	 a	way	 for	Lithuania	 to	 exert	 additional	 economic	pressure	
on	Belarus.	
Litgrid,	 the	Lithuanian	operator,	 is	positive	 that	 technical	flows	 that	serve	
to	balance	the	Belarusian	and	Lithuanian	grids	will	be	preserved	until	the	Baltic	
grids	become	synchronised	with	the	continental	European	grids,	irrespective	
of	the	type	of	power	plant	in	which	such	energy	is	generated.	With	the	currently	
existing	transmission	infrastructure	in	the	region,	Belarus	has	practically	no	
technical	possibility	to	export	its	electricity	to	the	Baltic	states	other	than	via	
Lithuania,	i.e.	it	cannot	do	this	via	Latvia	or	Finland.	It	would	have	to	develop	
36	 https://www.delfi.lt/verslas/energetika/ar-i-lietuva-pateks-astravo-elektra.d?id=76537663	
(accessed	on	4.12.2017).
37	 On	10	April	Litgrid	signed	a	contract	with	the	Lithuanian	company	Kauno	Tiltai	and	Swe-
den’s	ABB	for	the	reconstruction	of	two	transformer	stations	in	Ignalina	and	Utena	and	the	
dismantling,	by	the	spring	2021,	of	the	first	750	kV	ultra	high	voltage	power	line	between	
the	Ignalina	station	and	Belarus.	The	remaining	power	lines	between	Belarus	and	Lithu-
ania	will	also	be	dismantled	as	the	synchronisation	process	progresses,	Minister Naimski: 
„Nie” dla energii z Białorusi,	Energetyka	24,	17.03.2017,	https://www.etaplius.lt/lietuva-ruo-
siasi-astravo-ae-isigyti-elektros-is-baltarusijos-bus-neimanoma
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new	interconnections,	e.g.	via	Latvia,	but	no	such	plans	have	been	mentioned	
to	date.	This	means	that	since	the	Lithuanian	parliament	decided	to	block	trade	
in	Belarusian	energy,	Lithuania	does	not	need	backing	in	the	form	of	similar	
decisions	by	Latvia,	Estonia	or	Finland	 to	prevent	Belarusian	energy	 from	
entering	its	market	via	the	grids	of	other	countries	in	the	region.	
However,	the	decision	to	block	trade	is	controversial	in	view	of	EU	market	regu-
lations.	Taking	such	measures	in	relation	to	Belarus	will	have	to	be	approved	
by	the	European	institutions,	which	may	end	up	in	a	dispute	between	Lithuania	
and	the	European	Commission.	To	argue	its	case	to	the	European	institutions,	
Vilnius	has	represented Astravyets as a purely political project inspired 
by Russia, which Belarus has limited control of, forcing Lithuania to more 
broadly consider various safety aspects of the project. Lithuania demon-
strates that while the HVVER-1200 reactor technology is not controver-
sial, Rosatom has not complied with safety standards while implementing 
the investment, similar to other projects which it has carried out in Russia 
and abroad. Lithuania	will	therefore	have	to	convince	the	EU	decision	mak-
ers	that	the	situation	concerning	the	construction	and	future	operation	of	the	
Astravyets	plant	 is	extraordinary	and	that	the	Lithuanian	government	has	
to	take	measures	to	respond	to	a	wide	range	of	threats,	including	natural	dis-
asters,	human	error	caused	by	negligent	approach	to	safety	standards,	incom-
petent	oversight	or	hostile	action,	in	particular	by	Russia,	such	as	deliberately	
causing	panic	or	sabotage	using	hybrid	warfare	means.
3.2. Synchronising the Baltic energy grids with continental Europe
In	the	aftermath	of	Lithuania’s	decision	to	block	the	sale	of	energy	from	the	
Astravyets	plant,	Vilnius	stepped	up	efforts	regarding	the	synchronisation	
of	the	Baltic	grids.	The	Lithuanian	government	managed	to	persuade	Latvia	
and	Estonia	to	accept	the	variant	(which	is	promoted	by	Lithuania	and	regarded	
as	most	favourable	by	the	European	Commission)	to	synchronise	using	the	Pol-
ish-Lithuanian	LitPol	Link	interconnection.38	According	to	the	management	
of	Litgrid,	the	Lithuanian	grid	operator,39	Russia	(along	with	Belarus)	has	been	
preparing	 for	 desynchronisation	 already	 since	 2014.	 Information	 obtained	
38	 On	 22	March	 2018,	 the	 prime	ministers	 of	 Poland,	 Latvia	 and	 Estonia	 and	 the	 president	
of	Lithuania	reached	agreement,	 in	the	presence	of	European	Commission	President	 Jean-
Claude	Juncker,	on	synchronising	their	electricity	grids	with	continental	Europe	via	Poland.	
39	 A.	Jockus, Lietuva pajėgi viena blokuoti Astravo AE,	3.10.2017,	https://www.lzinios.lt/lzinios/
ekonomika/lietuva-pajegi-viena-blokuoti-astravo-ae/251391	
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by	Litgrid	shows	that	Russia	has	also	been	expanding	its	own	transmission	
system	in	recent	years,	with	new	lines	being	built	along	the	borders	of	Latvia,	
Estonia	and	Belarus	which	form	an	inner	ring	alternative	to	BRELL.	According	
to	Litgrid	management,	the	blueprint	for	grid	expansion	related	to	the	connec-
tion	of	the	Astravyets	plant	also	resembles	the	creation	of	another	ring	along	
the	border	with	Lithuania,	to	bypass	those	elements	of	the	current	BRELL	ring	
that	are	within	Lithuanian	territory	–this	clearly	points	to	desynchronisation.	
The	Lithuanian	operator	has	also	monitored	the	situation	in	the	Kaliningrad	
Oblast	where	the	program	to	expand	(coal	and	gas)	capacity	for	the	purposes	
of	risk	management	is	underway.	Litgrid	interprets	those	measures	as	prepara-
tion	of	the	Kaliningrad	grid	to	operate	in	isolation	(possibly	as	early	as	2020),	
as	the	capacity	reserve	will	allow	the	oblast	to	remain	stable	without	BRELL.	
Lithuania	and	the	other	Baltic	states	will	also	have	to	trial	operation	in	isolation,	
as	such	tests	are	required	before	the	EU	operators	can	decide	to	synchronise	the	
Baltic	states.	The	tests	are	planned	to	be	carried	out	in	June	2019.	Meanwhile,	
there	are	many	indications	suggesting	that	Russia’s	activities	should	be	inter-
preted	as	preparations	for	a	so-called	pre-emptive	desynchronisation,	which	
may	be	risky	for	the	Baltic	states.	However,	whether	that	happens	will	depend	
on	Moscow’s	political	decision.	Russia	might	treat	such	a	measure	as	a	kind	
of	sanction	for	Lithuania’s	unfriendly	political	course.	According	to	Litgrid	rep-
resentatives,	Russia	will	be	able	to	take	steps	that	would	negatively	affect	the	
Baltic	states’	grids.	In	certain	conditions,	disconnecting	might	lead	to	a	blackout,	
in	the	event	of	which	the	Lithuanian	operator	says	it	would	need	3	to	5	days	
to	restore	system	stability,	and	that	would	surely	render	the	synchronisation	
with	continental	Europe	more	difficult.	According	to	the	Lithuanian	security	
services,	Russia	has	been	involved	in	activities	aimed	at	delaying	the	Baltic	
states’	synchronisation.40	It	has	been	lobbying	various	EU	institutions	on	the	
topic,	including	the	European	Commission.
3.3. The impact of the Belarusian Nuclear Power Plant on energy policy 
discussions within Lithuania
The	Lithuanian	Greens,	which	have	been	part	of	the	largest	grouping	in	the	
parliament	since	the	2016	elections	won	by	the	Lithuanian	Farmers	and	Greens	
Union	(LVŽS),	have	become	actively	involved	in	the	expert	and	political	debate	
around	the	Astravyets	project.	The	LVŽS	and	their	leader	Ramūnas	Karbauskis	
40	 Lietuvos	žvalgyba:	Rusija	siekia	paveikti	elektros	tinklų	sinchronizavimo	projektą,	Delfi,	
26.03.2018,	https://www.delfi.lt/spausdinti/?id=77526609	
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have	been	arguing	that	the	previous	governments	were	ineffective	in	stopping	
the	Astravyets	project	because	the	Lithuanian	political	elites	avoided	criticis-
ing	the	very	idea	of	using	nuclear	technology	for	power	generation	as	that	could	
have	harmed	the	Lithuanian	nuclear	project	in	Visaginas,41	the	cornerstone	
of	Lithuania’s	National	Energy	Strategy	that	remains	in	force.42	
The	current	government	has	been	pushing	for	an	amendment	of	the	strategy	
with	a	view	to	radically	rebuilding	the	development	concept	of	Lithuania’s	power	
generation	sector	towards	local	and	renewable	energy	sources.43	The	amended	
draft	does	not	mention	Visaginas	or	nuclear	energy.	A	joint	position	of	the	Lithu-
anian	parliamentary	parties	on	the	Belarusian	Nuclear	Power	Plant	may	pro-
vide	a	basis	for	the	current	government	to	finally	close	the	question	of	returning	
to	nuclear	energy	in	Lithuania.	If	Lithuania	becomes	an	advocate	of	a	nuclear	
phaseout	in	the	EU,	it	will	also	withdraw	from	other	nuclear	projects	in	the	
European	Union,	including	in	Poland.	
41	 In	2009,	Lithuania	signed	an	agreement	with	Japan’s	Hitachi,	under	which	the	latter	would	
deliver	a	Japanese-made	reactor	for	the	planned	nuclear	power	plant	in	Visaginas	and	co-
finance	the	project	with	Lithuania,	Latvia	and	Estonia.	The	Lithuanian	government	treated	
the	 announcements	 regarding	 the	 Russian	 and	 Belarusian	 nuclear	 projects	 as	 attempts	
at	pressuring	investors	in	order	to	undermine	the	Visaginas	project	by	implying	it	would	
face	 too	 much	 competition	 in	 the	 regional	 electricity	 generation	 market.	The	 pressure	
of	 two	competing	projects	 increased	 the	 investment	risk	of	 the	Visaginas	project.	Lithu-
ania	was	not	able	to	produce	convincing	evidence	to	its	partners	that	the	Visaginas	plant	
would	be	competitive,	as	a	result	of	which	the	governments	of	Latvia	and	Estonia	lost	much	
of	their	initial	interest	in	the	project	and	it	failed	to	get	off	the	ground.	
42	 The	text	of	the	strategy	can	be	consulted	at:	https://e-seimas.lrs.lt/portal/legalAct/lt/TAD/
TAIS.291371	
43	 During	the	last	decade,	Lithuania’s	renewable	sector	developed	dynamically	thanks	to	pri-
vate	 investments	 and	 public	 subsidies.	 Investors	 benefited	 from	 the	 2010	 closure	 of	 the	
old	nuclear	power	plant	in	Ignalina	(near	Visaginas)	and	may	be	concerned	that	a	return	
to	nuclear	energy	in	Lithuania	would	undermine	the	profitability	of	renewable	projects,	
including	onshore	wind	and,	in	the	future,	also	offshore	wind.	The	Lithuanian	government	
has	been	postponing	the	authorisation	of	Baltic	offshore	wind	farms,	even	though	there	are	
companies	interested	in	participating	in	tenders.	
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v. the proBleM of utIlIsINg the power geNerated 
at astravyets
The	fact	the	plant	was	located	near	the	Lithuanian	border,	as	well	as	the	pro-
visions	of	 the	current	Energy	Security	Concept	of	 the	Republic	of	Belarus	
clearly	suggest	that	one	of	the	main	original	objectives	behind	the	construc-
tion	of	the	Belarusian	Nuclear	Power	Plant	was	to	export	energy.	However,	
Lithuania’s	objections	and	Poland’s	refusal	to	buy	energy	from	Belarus	have	
cut	Belarus	off	from	its	main	potential	export	markets.44	In	theory,	the	crea-
tion	of	a	common	electricity	market	of	the	Eurasian	Economic	Union	(EEU),	
scheduled	to	take	place	on	1	July	2019,	will	open	some	export	possibilities	for	
Belarus.	However,	according	to	calculations	by	the	Eurasian	Development	
Bank	experts,	the	EEU	member	states	are	reporting	declining	energy	demand	
and	most	of	them	(with	the	exception	of	Kyrgyzstan)	are	experiencing	capac-
ity	surpluses,	not	deficits.	Moreover,	the	effective	functioning	of	the	common	
electricity	market	will	be	hindered	by	the	Soviet	legacy	system	solutions	still	
in	existence,	such	as	the	absence	of	decoupling	between	power	transmission	
and	power	generation.	In	view	of	this,	it	is	unlikely	that	Belarus	will	be	able	
to	sell	larger	volumes	of	electricity	to	the	EEU	in	the	near	future,	even	after	
the	common	market	is	formally	established.45	
In	this	situation,	the	Belarusian	leadership	will	have	to	change	the	Astravyets	
plant’s	export	profile,	at	least	temporarily,	and	channel	all	power	generated	
there	into	the	domestic	market.46	As	a	result	Belarus,	which	currently	produces	
around	33-34	TWh	a	year	and	consumes	between	37	and	38	TWh	a	year,	will	
be	able	to	stop	importing	electricity	from	Russia	(3	TWh	in	recent	years)	after	
the	Astravyets	plant	becomes	operational.	The	Belarusian	side	often	presents	
44	 For	several	years,	the	Belarusian	side	lobbied	for	the	modernisation	and	expansion	of	the	
Poland-Belarus	grid	interconnection	(the	Ros-Narew	powerline)	with	a	view	to	expanding	
its	capacity	(in	both	directions)	to	1,000	MW/8	TWh	a	year.	The	power	line,	which	has	not	
been	used	since	2004,	was	considered	by	the	Belarusian	side	as	one	of	the	important	chan-
nels	for	the	future	export	of	electricity	from	the	Astravyets	nuclear	power	plant.	In	2017,	
the	line’s	owner,	PSE,	decided	to	dismantle	it.
45	 https://www.belrynok.by/ru/page/economics/4850	
46	 Representatives	of	the	Belarusian	government	(including	Uladzimir	Semashko,	the	deputy	
prime	minister	in	charge	of	energy,	in	an	interview	for	the	Belarusian	TV	on	4	March	2018)	
still	 claim	that	power	will	be	exported,	but	 they	are	not	able	 to	name	a	specific	market,	
https://news.tut.by/economics/583699.	html	
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this	phasing	out	of	imports	as	the	first	tangible	benefit	of	the	Astravyets	pro-
ject.47	In	late	2017,	the	Belarusian	government	decided	to	fully	switch	to	domes-
tic	capacity	already	in	2018,	i.e.	even	before	the	Astravyets	plant	is	launched,	
because	of	the	growing	prices	of	Russian	energy.	Thus,	for	the	first	time	in	its	
history,	Belarus	stopped	importing	electricity.48	However,	if	the	maximum	out-
put	of	the	Astravyets	nuclear	power	plant	is	18	TWh	a	year,	that	will	still	leave	
a	surplus	of	14	to15	TWh	that	needs	to	be	utilised.
The	Belarusian	government	has	addressed	the	problem	of	the	lack	of	access	
to	external	markets	and	already	in	September	2015	established	a	special	inter-
departmental	working	group	for	the	integration	of	the	nuclear	power	plant	with	
the	country’s	energy	system.	The	group	developed	a	comprehensive	plan	for	
the	development	of	the	electricity	sector	to	2025	in	view	of	the	launch	of	the	
Belarusian	Nuclear	Power	Plant;	it	was	approved	in	March	2016.	The	measures	
envisaged	in	the	plan	include	tasks	directly	related	to	preparing	the	domestic	
infrastructure	to	utilise	energy	not	generated	from	gas.	The	large-scale	instal-
lation	of	electric	boilers	at	CHP	plants	of	the	state-owned	operator	Belenergo	
with	a	total	capacity	of	535	MW,	individual	boilers	with	a	total	capacity	of	450	
MW	and	other	facilities	with	a	total	capacity	of	200	MW.	The	aim	is	to	utilise	
some	of	the	power	generated	at	Astravyets.	The	plan	also	envisages	the	creation	
of	reserve	(peak)	capacity	of	800	MW,	including	400	MW	to	2018.49	However,	
according	to	the	newest	reports,	the	Belarusian	authorities	decided	not	to	build	
a	new	separate	plant	to	ensure	reserve	capacity.	Instead,	existing	plants	will	
be	expanded,	including	the	CHP	plant	No	5	in	the	Minsk	Oblast.50	Moreover,	
in	order	to	optimise	the	system,	outside	the	heating	season	the	Astravyets	plant	
will	use	only	80%	of	its	capacity.51	The	government	has	also	announced	that	
47	 It	 should	be	 remembered	 that	Belarus	already	has	 sufficient	 capacity	 to	meet	 its	 electricity	
needs.	It	imports	energy	because	it	is	not	economically	justified	to	supply	electricity	to	the	east-
ern	part	of	the	country	from	the	power	plants	located	in	the	western	oblasts.	The	launch	of	the	
Astravyets	plant	will	solve	the	problem	by	making	imports	no	longer	economically	viable.
48	 Беларусь впервые отказалась от закупки электроэнергии,	 21.02.2018,	http://naviny.by/
new/20180221/1519235858-belarus-vpervye-otkazalas-ot-zakupki-elektroenergii
49	 This	means	capacity	that	ensures	adequate	generation	levels	at	times	of	peak	energy	con-
sumption.	 In	 some	 cases,	 separate	 power	 plants	 are	 built	 to	 back	 up	 the	 nuclear	 power	
plant.
50	 It	is	the	newest	CHP	plant	in	Belarus	whose	construction	was	completed	in	2012,	Пиково-
резервный источник планируется ввести на ТЭЦ-5 в Пуховичском районе,	 25.04.2017,	
http://atom.belta.by/ru/news_ru/view/pik-rezervnogo-istochnika-planiruetsja-vvesti-
na-tets-5-v-puxovichskom-rajone-9262	
51	 See:	 Министерство	 энергетики	 Республики	 Беларусь,	 http://minenergo.gov.by/wp-
content/uploads/Комлпексный-План.pdf	
39
O
SW
 S
TU
D
IE
S 
 0
7/
20
18
it	would	create	incentives	for	buyers	to	increase	energy	consumption	at	night,	
where	the	biggest	surpluses	occur.	Some	Belarusian	CHP	plants	are	installing	
electrode	boilers	that	can	use	the	night-time	energy	surplus	to	create	heat	that	
can	be	delivered	to	customers	at	times	of	peak	demand.	All	the	above	invest-
ments	are	to	be	carried	out	by	2020	and,	according	to	estimates	by	the	Min-
istry	of	Energy,	will	cost	US$	500-700	million	but,	notably,	the	governmental	
plan	does	not	specify	the	sources	of	financing	for	this	expensive	upgrade.52	It	
seems	that	the	high	cost	is	due	to	the	fact	that	the	government	has	selected	
high-quality,	expensive	boilers	manufactured	by	renowned	Western	companies	
such	as	Germany’s	BBS	GmbH	or	Sweden’s	Zander	&	Ingeström	AB.	In	August	
2016,	boilers	manufactured	by	the	latter	company	were	installed	at	the	CHP	
plant	in	Gomel	as	part	of	one	of	a	handful	of	upgrade	project	that	have	actually	
been	carried	out.53
However,	despite	the	official	statements	and	the	measures	taken	by	the	govern-
ment,	it	is	still	far	from	clear	that	smooth	functioning	of	the	nuclear	power	plant	
will	be	ensured	and	the	risk	of	malfunction	eliminated.	Other	ways	to	simu-
late	domestic	electricity	demand	have	also	been	considered.	For	example,	the	
question	of	developing	infrastructure	for	electric	buses	and	cars	(which	are	
almost	entirely	unseen	in	Belarus).	The	complete	electrification	of	residential	
buildings,	including	heating	systems,	has	also	been	discussed.54	Finally,	the	
idea	to	utilise	the	energy	from	Astravyets	to	power	the	energy-intensive	devices	
performing	crypto-currency	operations	(bitcoin	mining)	has	also	been	floated	
and	is	being	officially	studied	by	the	Belarusian	Academy	of	Sciences.55	How-
ever,	all	those	concepts	are	still	very	vague,	making	it	difficult	to	estimate	how	
much	energy	they	could	utilise.	
As	 regards	 reserve	 capacity,	 in	September	2016	 the	Belarusian	 side	 signed	
an	agreement	with	Germany’s	Siemens.	From	the	point	of	view	of	the	energy	
52	 See:	Концепции, программы и комплексные планы, Министерство	энергетики	Республики	
Беларусь,	http://minenergo.gov.by/zakonodatelstvo/koncepcii_i_proframmi	
53	 http://www.belmarket.by/ekonomicheskoe-napryazhenie-aes;	 О ходе реконструкции 
Гомельской ТЭЦ-2 с установкой электрических котлов,	 Министерство	 энергетики	
Республики	Беларусь,	11.08.2016,	http://minenergo.gov.by/o-hode-rekonstruktsii-gomel-
skoj-te-ts-2-s-ustanovkoj-e-lektricheskih-kotlov	
54	 А.	Шрайбман,	Куда мы денем энергию с АЭС? Мифы и реальность,	4.09.2017,	https://news.
tut.by/economics/558443.html	
55	 Cryptocurrency	operations	(including	mining)	were	legalised	in	Belarus	under	the	presi-
dential	 decree	 “On	 the	 development	 of	 the	 digital	 economy”	 which	 entered	 into	 force	
on	28	March	2018.	See:	БелАЭС предложили использовать для майнинга криптовалют,	
29.12.2017,	https://42.tut.by/575038	
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system’s	security	and	efficiency,	the	decision	seems	justified.	However,	as	Bela-
rus	has	still	not	ensured	financing	for	the	project,	choosing	such	an	expen-
sive	provider	will	further	increase	the	risk	of	delays,	which	means	that	it	will	
not	be	technically	possible	to	distribute	the	power	generated	at	the	Astravy-
ets	plant.	As	the	project	is	mired	in	controversy,	Belarus	is	unlikely	to	obtain	
financing	from	the	EU	or	from	international	financial	institutions.	That	leaves	
the	Chinese	banks,	which	are	already	involved	in	the	implementation	of	infra-
structural	projects	in	Belarus,	including	the	construction	and	modernisation	
of	transmission	grids,	as	the	only	potential	lenders.	
The	blueprint	for	the	expansion	of	transmission	infrastructure	for	the	pur-
poses	of	the	Astravyets	nuclear	power	plant	envisages	the	construction	of	more	
than	1,000	km	of	high-voltage	power	lines	(330	kV)	and	upgrades	of	more	than	
600	km	of	110-330	kV	power	lines.	As	part	of	those	works,	in	March	2018	the	
modernisation	of	the	Lida-Hrodna	line	was	completed,	which	will	considerably	
facilitate	the	transmission	of	energy	from	the	Astravyets	plant	to	the	Hrodna	
Oblast.	Moreover,	a	transformer	station	is	going	to	be	built	in	Pastavy	(north-
western	Belarus)	and	three	existing	facilities,	in	Ros,	Smarhon	and	Stowbtsy,	
will	be	upgraded.	In	total,	those	investments	will	cost	US$	340	million,	of	which	
95%	will	be	financed	with	a	loan	granted	by	China	Exim	Bank	in	2013.	In	accord-
ance	with	the	investment	model	applied	by	China,	the	Chinese	NCPE	corpora-
tion	will	carry	out	some	of	the	works,	for	which	purpose	it	will	hire	or	is	already	
hiring	several	hundred	workers	from	China.56	In	2016,	reports	by	independent	
Belarusian	media	about	violations	of	environmental	standards	and	the	poor	
quality	of	work	carried	out	by	the	Chinese	investors,	leading	to	infrastructure	
damage	and	delays,	created	a	major	controversy	in	Belarus.57
It	is	notable	that	many	of	the	lines	to	be	built	or	upgraded	clearly	lead	towards	
the	Lithuanian	border,	which	is	indicative	of	the	original	export	orientation	
of	the	Astravyets	plant.	However,	in	view	of	Lithuania’s	firm	objections,	the	
Belarusian	government	has	to	opt	for	an	alternative	variant	and,	already	in	2015,	
a	Belenergo	representative	announced	that	the	Belarusian	grids	were	intended	
to	solely	serve	domestic	needs	and	that	–	even	if	export	to	Lithuania	is	impos-
sible	–	no	line	would	be	closed	down.58	However,	irrespective	of	the	steps	dis-
56	 http://www.belrynok.by/ru/page/economics/2766
57	 Белорусская земля «не принимает» ЛЭП Островецкой АЭС,	14.06.2016,	http://ex-press.by/
article.php?id=118246
58	 Т.	 Новикова,	 Китайская ЛЭП для Белорусской АЭС: незакрученные гайки,	 27.10.2015,	
https://news.tut.by/society/470297.html
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cussed	above,	Belarus	can	hardly	be	regarded	to	be	implementing	a	coherent	
and	comprehensive	strategy	for	the	operation	of	the	Astravyets	plant.	Rather,	
it	has	taken	a	series	of	poorly	considered	and	uncoordinated	measures	to	mini-
mise	the	cost	of	launching	and	operating	the	plant.	In	his	annual	address	to	the	
nation	delivered	on	24	April	2018,	President	Lukashenka	openly	admitted	that	
his	ministers	have	not	been	able	to	present	a	convincing	concept	for	the	utilisa-
tion	of	the	plant	and	its	integration	with	the	Belarusian	economy.	In	this	con-
text,	the	Belarusian	president	unequivocally	criticised	the	quality	of	the	work	
done	so	far	by	the	people	responsible	for	the	implementation	of	the	investment.59	
Russia	hopes	that	a	capacity	deficit	expected	to	hit	Central	Europe	(and	espe-
cially	Poland)	in	the	coming	years	will	force	decision	makers	to	change	tack	
and	enable	imports	of	energy	from	the	Astravyets	plant.	However,	since	that	
scenario	does	not	seem	very	likely	in	view	of	the	current	energy	strategies	pur-
sued	by	the	countries	in	the	region	(including	categorical	refusals	to	import	
electricity	from	Belarus	or	Russia	voiced	by	Poland	and	Lithuania),	it	seems	
more	probable	that	the	surplus	will	be	directed	to	the	Russian	market.	The	fact	
that	Rosatom	has	postponed	several	nuclear	projects	 in	Russia	might	point	
in	that	direction,	because	the	new	units	launched	in	recent	years	have	triggered	
a	spike	in	capacity	prices	and,	as	a	result,	higher	prices	for	individual	consumers	
(other	than	households).60	At	the	same	time,	power	plants	with	a	total	capacity	
of	around	50	GW	are	expected	to	be	decommissioned	in	Russia	between	2020–
2025.	To	date,	the	Russian	government	has	used	the	so-called	capacity	supply	
contracts	(in	Russian	–	договоры	о	предоставлении	мощности)	as	the	main	
model	for	investments	in	the	electricity	sector.	The	system,	which	has	been	
in	place	since	2011,	consists	in	private	electricity	companies	concluding	agree-
ments	under	which	they	commit	to	build	plants	with	a	specified	capacity	within	
a	set	period,	while	the	state	commits	to	reimburse	the	cost	of	the	investment.	
The	peak	of	such	payments	is	expected	to	take	place	in	2021–2022,	and	in	2026	
the	mechanism	is	to	be	phased	out.	It	is	unclear	if	a	similar	mechanism	will	
be	introduced	for	the	successive	years,	which	calls	into	question	the	prospects	
of	new	generation	capacity	being	built	in	Russia.	
59	 Лукашенко:	 большие	 начальники	 запили	 настолько,	 что	 на	 работу	 не	 ходили,	
24.04.2018,	 https://naviny.by/new/20180424/1524560400-lukashenko-o-stroitelstve-aes-
bolshie-nachalniki-zapili-nastolko-chto-na
60	 The	plans	to	postpone	the	completion	of	new	nuclear	units	concern	the	second	reactor	unit	
of	 the	 Leningradskaya	Nuclear	 Power	 Plant	 in	 particular	 (initially	 the	 1.2	GW	unit	was	
expected	 to	become	operational	 in	 January	2019).	Мирный атом откладывают в долгий 
ящик,	https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/3448572	
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Also	important	here	is	the	systematic	increase	in	energy	consumption	in	Rus-
sia	–	by	1.7%	in	2016	and	0.5%	in	2017,61	with	projections	of	1-1.2%	annual	growth	
in	the	successive	year.	This	trend	may	produce,	around	2026,	a	deficit	of	gen-
eration	capacity	in	Russia,	with	electricity	imports	from	third	countries	partly	
covering	the	deficit	of	electricity	production.	However,	it	is	extremely	unlikely	
that	the	price	of	electricity	generated	at	the	Astravyets	plan	can	be	competitive	
in	the	Russian	market.
lithuanian estimates concerning the price of energy generated at the 
Belarusian Npp
Arvydas Galinis, the head of the Complex Energy Studies lab at the Lithu-
anian Energy Institute in Kaunas, has compares the projected price of elec-
tricity from Astravyets with prices in the Nordic-Baltic region. In his view, 
in order for the construction of a nuclear power plant to be economically 
justified, the price of energy needs to be sufficient in view of the cost borne 
by the investors. Currently the average global market price of 1 kWh is 8.5 
eurocents. In the Lithuanian trading zone at the Nord Pool Spot exchange 
the price is lower, at around 3.5–4 eurocents per 1 kWh. The average price 
for the Nordic states at the Nord Pool Spot exchange in 2017 was around 3.2 
eurocents per 1 kWh. The price of electricity generated in Belarus from gas 
is currently 4-5 eurocents per 1 kWh. According to the Belarusian energy 
minister Uladzimir Patupchyk, the launch of the Astravyets plant will en-
able Belarus to reduce that price by 15%. The installed capacity of Astra-
vyets can produce 16.4 TWh a year. Even if all of that power was sold at 
current prices in Belarus, the annual revenues of the plant would reach 
around EUR 660 million, which means that the Russian loan would not be 
repaid within 15 years from the plant’s revenues alone. Optimistic and pes-
simistic simulations were conducted by Galinis while taking into account 
various parameters; they show that the cost of producing electricity ranges 
between 3.8 eurocents per 1 kWh (in the optimist variant) to 9.3 eurocents 
per 1 kWh (in the pessimistic model).62
61	 Потребление	электроэнергии	в	ЕЭС	России	в	2017	году	увеличилось	на	1,3%,	10.01.2018,	
https://www.eprussia.ru/news/base/2018/5600395.htm
62	 E.	Naprys,	Viskas, ką žinome apie Astrave kylantį monstrą: ekonominio pagrįstumo nėra – tik 
politinė ambicija,	 21.10.2017,	 https://www.15min.lt/verslas/naujiena/energetika/viskas-
ka-zinome-apie-astrave-kylanti-monstra-ekonominio-pagristumo-nera-tik-politine-
ambicija-664-868428?all#print	
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vI. coNclusIoN
There	has	been	a	lot	of	controversy	and	a	lack	of	clarity	around	the	construction	
of	the	nuclear	power	plant	in	Astravyets	in	recent	years,	triggering	tensions	
in	Belarus’s	international	environment.	Since	the	start	of	the	project,	the	lack	
of	transparency	and	clarity	about	the	intentions	of	the	actors	involved	has	been	
complicating	the	situation.	The	crucial	question	that	remains	concerns	the	eco-
nomic	viability	of	the	project,	especially	in	the	context	of	the	Russian	loan	and	
the	absence	of	realistic	opportunities	to	export	electricity	from	the	Astravyets	
plant	to	the	markets	of	EU	member	states	neighbouring	Belarus,	i.e.	to	achieve	
one	of	the	project’s	original	key,	albeit	undeclared	objectives.
The	current	efforts	by	the	Belarusian	government	to	integrate	the	power	plant	
with	the	internal	energy	market	can	hardly	guarantee	a	successful	comple-
tion	of	the	investment,	especially	since	there	seems	to	be	insufficient	money	
to	finance	 them.	 Statements	 by	Belarusian	 officials,	 including	Alyaksandr	
Lukashenka	himself,	 indirectly	 suggest	 that	many	 important	 issues	 (such	
as	reserve	capacity	or	ways	to	utilise	the	energy	during	the	night-time	decline	
in	consumption)	are	still	to	be	resolved	and	are	being	brushed	over	with	gen-
eral	declarations.	In	this	situation,	the	assumption	made	by	Minsk	that	the	
construction	of	the	power	plant	would	be	repaid	within	15	years	seems	unreal-
istic	and	intended	mainly	for	propaganda	purposes.	It	may	also	turn	out	that,	
because	of	the	capacity	surplus,	the	power	plant	will	not	operate	at	its	full	capac-
ity,	e.g.	it	will	use	only	one	of	the	two	planned	units.	In	an	extreme	scenario	
it	may	even	never	be	activated,	despite	the	fact	that	construction	works	are	
already	very	advanced.	
Because	of	the	lack	of	transparency,	it	is	not	possible	to	fully	assess	the	envi-
ronmental	safety	of	the	plant	during	construction	and	subsequent	operation.	
However,	it	should	be	noted	that	the	only	aspects	about	which	there	is	full	clar-
ity	are	evidently	unfavourable	for	Minsk.	The	launch	of	the	Belarusian	Nuclear	
Power	Plant	will	entrench	Belarus’s	energy	dependence	on	Russia	and	the	loan	
agreed	to	finance	the	project	will	be	a	major	burden	on	the	Belarusian	public	
finances	for	many	years	and	will	provide	the	Kremlin	with	yet	another	instru-
ment	of	pressure.
Another	important	aspect	of	the	Astravyets	plant	concerns	its	implications	for	
Belarus’s	political	relations	with	Lithuania.	If	the	project	continues,	and	espe-
cially	when	the	plant	starts	operations,	the	investment	will	continue	to	generate	
tensions	between	Minsk	and	Vilnius.	As	a	result,	the	Belarusian	side	will	not	
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be	able	to	count	on	Lithuania’s	support	in	international	forums,	including	the	
EU	where	Lithuania	was	until	recently	one	of	the	main	advocates	for	Belarus.	
Lithuania	has	been	making	efforts	to	keep	its	position	as	a	leader	of	the	Eastern	
Partnership	to	be	able	to	influence	the	division	of	funding	under	the	EU’s	finan-
cial	instruments	for	Belarus	in	the	years	2018–2020.	It	is	also	possible	that	other	
countries	may	start	to	actively	oppose	the	plant,	especially	if	sudden	incidents	
occur	that	may	undermine	the	safety	of	the	people	in	the	region.	Because	of	all	
those	factors	it	is	already	safe	to	say	that	the	nuclear	power	plant	in	Astravyets	
will	create	more	trouble	than	added	value	for	Belarus	and	its	neighbours.
JoANNA HyNDLE-HuSSEIN, SzymoN KARDAś, KAmIL KłySIńSKI, 
WoJCIECH KoNońCzuK (EDItoR) 
46
O
SW
 S
TU
D
IE
S 
 0
7/
20
18
Mapa. Electric grids in the region
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Source:	EESTI	ENERGIA	https://www.energia.ee,	ENTSOE	https://www.entsoe.eu,	PSE	https://www.pse.pl
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